RESOLUTION - ACTION REQUESTED 2017-156

MEETING: March 28, 2017

TO: The Board of Supervisors

FROM: Chevon Kothari, Human Services Director

RE: Amendment 14-90069 A05 to the 2014-2017 Contract with DHCS

RECOMMENDATION AND JUSTIFICATION:
Approve Amendment 14-90069 A05 to the Current Drug Medi-Cal (DMC) and Negotiated Net Amount (NNA) Multi-Year Agreement with the State Department of Health Care Services (DHCS); and Authorize the Board of Supervisors Chair to Sign the Amendment, the CCC-307 Certification and the California Civil Rights Laws Certification.

A copy of the full initial agreement is on file with the Clerk of the Board’s Office. Amendment 14-90069 A05 1) modifies the terms and conditions; 2) increases the funding for budget year 3 to compensate the Contractor for performing additional services, and identifies the changes in Exhibit B Attachment I A4 - Funding Amounts.

Text additions made in this amendment are displayed in **bold and underline**. Text deletions are displayed as strike through text (i.e., *Strike*).

Paragraph 3 (maximum amount payable) on the face of the original STD 213 is amended to read: "STD 213 is increased by $14,947 and is amended to read "$1,334,149 (One Million, Three Hundred Thirty-Four Thousand, One Hundred Forty-Nine Dollars)."

This contract is subject to amendment by the State. Funding to provide County Substance Use Disorder services is contingent upon approval of contract amendments issued by DHCS.

BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF BOARD ACTIONS:
The Board approved the current multi-year contract with the State Department of Health Care Services (DHCS) on November 12, 2014 by resolution 2014-579.

A previous Amendment 14-90069 A01 to the 2014-2017 Contract with DHCS was approved by the Board on May 12, 2015 by Resolution 2015-215.

A previous Amendment 14-90069 A02 to the 2014-2017 Contract with DHCS was approved by the Board on September 22, 2015 by Resolution 2015-456.
A previous Amendment 14-90069 A03 to the 2014-2017 Contract with DHCS was approved by the Board on March 1, 2016 by Resolution 2016-93.

A previous Amendment 14-90069 A04 to the 2014-2017 Contract with DHCS was approved by the Board on September 20, 2016 by Resolution 2016-494.

**ALTERNATIVES AND CONSEQUENCES OF NEGATIVE ACTION:**
If this contract amendment is not approved, DHCS will discontinue funding for Mariposa County alcohol and drug programs.

**FINANCIAL IMPACT:**
County Alcohol and Drug programs are funded by this contract. The changes in this amendment have been incorporated into the 2017-2018 Alcohol & Drug budget. There is no impact to the County General Fund.

**ATTACHMENTS:**
A05 STD 213A - FY 2014-17 - Mariposa (PDF)
A05 Exhibit B, Attachment I A4 - FY 2014-17 - Mariposa (PDF)
Exhibit G, Attachment I A2 (PDF)
A05 CIVIL RIGHTS - FY 2014-17 - Mariposa (DOCX)
CCC-307 - FY 2014-17 Mariposa (PDF)

**CAO RECOMMENDATION**
Requested Action Recommended

署名：
Dallin Kimble, Interim CAO  3/23/2017

**RESULT:**  ADOPTED BY CONSENT VOTE [UNANIMOUS]
MOWER:  Kevin Cann, District IV Supervisor
SECONDER:  Merlin Jones, District II Supervisor
AYES:  Menetrey, Smallcombe, Jones, Long, Cann
1. This Agreement is entered into between the State Agency and Contractor named below:
   
   State Agency's Name
   Department of Health Care Services
   (Also known as DHCS, CDHS, DHS or the State)
   
   Contractor's Name
   County of Mariposa
   (Also referred to as Contractor)

2. The term of this Agreement is: July 1, 2014 through June 30, 2017

3. The maximum amount of this Agreement after this amendment is: One Million, Three Hundred Thirty-Four Thousand, One Hundred Forty-Nine Dollars

4. The parties mutually agree to this amendment as follows. All actions noted below are by this reference made a part of the Agreement and incorporated herein:

   I. Amendment effective date: July 1, 2016

   II. Purpose of amendment: This amendment 1) modifies the terms and conditions; and 2) an increase in the budget year 3 to compensate the Contractor for performing additional services, and identifies the changes in Exhibit B Attachment I A4 - Funding Amounts.

   III. Certain changes made in this amendment are shown as: Text additions are displayed in **bold and underline**, Text deletions are displayed as strike through text (i.e., Strike).

   IV. Paragraph 3 (maximum amount payable) on the face of the original STD 213 is increased by $14,947 and is amended to read:
   
   $1,334,149 (One Million, Three Hundred Thirty-Four Thousand, One Hundred Forty-Nine Dollars)

   (Continued on next page)

All other terms and conditions shall remain the same.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Agreement has been executed by the parties hereto.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTRACTOR</th>
<th>CALIFORNIA Department of General Services Use Only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>County of Mariposa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorized Signature</td>
<td>Date Signed (Do not type)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall Long, Board Chair, County of Mariposa</td>
<td>3/28/17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printed Name and Title of Person Signing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Address</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.O. Box 99</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mariposa, CA 95338</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| STATE OF CALIFORNIA | |
|---------------------|-----------------
| Agency Name | Department of Health Care Services |
| Authorized Signature | Date Signed (Do not type) |
| Don Rodriguez, Chief, Contract Management Unit | 4/17/17 |
| Printed Name and Title of Person Signing | |
| Address | 1501 Capitol Avenue, Suite 71.2048, MS 1400, P.O. Box 997413, Sacramento, CA 95899-7413 |

Exempt per: DGS memo dated 07/10/96 and Welfare and Institutions Code 15281.7

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

STEVEN W. DAHLEM
COUNTY COUNSEL
INFORMATION EXCHANGE AGREEMENT
BETWEEN
THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (SSA)
AND
THE CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH CARE SERVICES (STATE AGENCY)

A. PURPOSE: The purpose of this Information Exchange Agreement ("IEA") is to establish terms, conditions, and safeguards under which SSA will disclose to the State Agency certain information, records, or data (herein "data") to assist the State Agency in administering certain federally funded state-administered benefit programs (including state-funded state supplementary payment programs under Title XVI of the Social Security Act) identified in this IEA. By entering into this IEA, the State Agency agrees to comply with:

- the terms and conditions set forth in the Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act Agreement ("CMPPA Agreement") attached as Attachment 1, governing the State Agency's use of the data disclosed from SSA's Privacy Act System of Records; and
- all other terms and conditions set forth in this IEA.

B. PROGRAMS AND DATA EXCHANGE SYSTEMS: (1) The State Agency will use the data received or accessed from SSA under this IEA for the purpose of administering the federally funded, state-administered programs identified in Table 1 below. In Table 1, the State Agency has identified: (a) each federally funded, state-administered program that it administers; and (b) each SSA data exchange system to which the State Agency needs access in order to administer the identified program. The list of SSA's data exchange systems is attached as Attachment 2:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 1</th>
<th>FEDERALLY FUNDED BENEFIT PROGRAMS</th>
<th>SSA Data Exchange System(s)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Program</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>[X]</td>
<td>Medicaid</td>
<td>BENDEX/SDX/EVS/SVES/SOLQ/SVES I-Citizenship /Quarters of Coverage/Prisoner Query</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□</td>
<td>Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>□</td>
<td>Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP- formally Food Stamps)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>□</td>
<td>Unemployment Compensation (Federal)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>□</td>
<td>Unemployment Compensation (State)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>□</td>
<td>State Child Support Agency</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>□</td>
<td>Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LI-HEAP)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>□</td>
<td>Workers Compensation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□</td>
<td>Vocational Rehabilitation Services</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Program</td>
<td>SSA Data Exchange System(s)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foster Care (IV-E)</td>
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<tr>
<td>State Health Insurance Program (S-CIP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Women, Infants and Children (W.I.C.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Medicare Savings Programs (MSP)</td>
<td>LIS File</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicare 1144 (Outreach)</td>
<td>Medicare 1144 Outreach File</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) The State Agency will use each identified data exchange system only for the purpose of administering the specific program for which access to the data exchange system is provided. SSA data exchange systems are protected by the Privacy Act and federal law prohibits the use of SSA’s data for any purpose other than the purpose of administering the specific program for which such data is disclosed. In particular, the State Agency will use: (a) the tax return data disclosed by SSA only to determine individual eligibility for, or the amount of, assistance under a state plan pursuant to Section 1137 programs and child support enforcement programs in accordance with 26 U.S.C. § 6103(1)(B); and (b) the citizenship status data disclosed by SSA under the Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111-3, only for the purpose of determining entitlement to Medicaid and CHIP program for new applicants. The State Agency also acknowledges that SSA’s citizenship data may be less than 50 percent current. Applicants for SSNs report their citizenship data at the time they apply for their SSNs; there is no obligation for an individual to report to SSA a change in his or her immigration status until he or she files a claim for benefits.

C. PROGRAM QUESTIONNAIRE: Prior to signing this IEA, the State Agency will complete and submit to SSA a program questionnaire for each of the federally funded, state-administered programs checked in Table 1 above. SSA will not disclose any data under this IEA until it has received and approved the completed program questionnaire for each of the programs identified in Table 1 above.
D. TRANSFER OF DATA: SSA will transmit the data to the State Agency under this IEA using the data transmission method identified in Table 2 below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TRANSFER OF DATA</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ Data will be transmitted directly between SSA and the State Agency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[X] Data will be transmitted directly between SSA and the California Office of Technology (State Transmission/Transfer Component (&quot;STC&quot;)) by the File Transfer Management System, a secure mechanism approved by SSA. The STC will serve as the conduit between SSA and the State Agency pursuant to the State STC Agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ Data will be transmitted directly between SSA and the Interstate Connection Network (&quot;ICON&quot;). ICON is a wide area telecommunications network connecting state agencies that administer the state unemployment insurance laws. When receiving data through ICON, the State Agency will comply with the “Systems Security Requirements for SSA Web Access to SSA Information Through the ICON,” attached as Attachment 3.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


F. CONTRACTOR/AGENT RESPONSIBILITIES: The State Agency will restrict access to the data obtained from SSA to only those authorized State employees, contractors, and agents who need such data to perform their official duties in connection with purposes identified in this IEA. At SSA’s request, the State Agency will obtain from each of its contractors and agents a current list of the employees of its contractors and agents who have access to SSA data disclosed under this IEA. The State Agency will require its contractors, agents, and all employees of such contractors or agents with authorized access to the SSA data disclosed under this IEA, to comply with the terms and conditions set forth in this IEA, and not to duplicate, disseminate, or disclose such data without obtaining SSA’s prior written approval. In addition, the State Agency will comply with the limitations on use, duplication, and redisclosure of SSA data set forth in Section IX. of the CMPPA Agreement, especially with respect to its contractors and agents.
G. SAFEGUARDING AND REPORTING RESPONSIBILITIES FOR PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION ("PII"):

1. The State Agency will ensure that its employees, contractors, and agents:
   a. properly safeguard PII furnished by SSA under this IEA from loss, theft or inadvertent disclosure;
   b. understand that they are responsible for safeguarding this information at all times, regardless of whether or not the State employee, contractor, or agent is at his or her regular duty station;
   c. ensure that laptops and other electronic devices/media containing PII are encrypted and/or password protected;
   d. send emails containing PII only if encrypted or if to and from addresses that are secure; and
   e. limit disclosure of the information and details relating to a PII loss only to those with a need to know.

2. If an employee of the State Agency or an employee of the State Agency’s contractor or agent becomes aware of suspected or actual loss of PII, he or she must immediately contact the State Agency official responsible for Systems Security designated below or his or her delegate. That State Agency official or delegate must then notify the SSA Regional Office Contact and the SSA Systems Security Contact identified below. If, for any reason, the responsible State Agency official or delegate is unable to notify the SSA Regional Office or the SSA Systems Security Contact within 1 hour, the responsible State Agency official or delegate must call SSA’s Network Customer Service Center ("NCSC") at 410-965-7777 or toll free at 1-888-772-6661 to report the actual or suspected loss. The responsible State Agency official or delegate will use the worksheet, attached as Attachment 5, to quickly gather and organize information about the incident. The responsible State Agency official or delegate must provide to SSA timely updates as any additional information about the loss of PII becomes available.

3. SSA will make the necessary contact within SSA to file a formal report in accordance with SSA procedures. SSA will notify the Department of Homeland Security’s United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team if loss or potential loss of PII related to a data exchange under this IEA occurs.

4. If the State Agency experiences a loss or breach of data, it will determine whether or not to provide notice to individuals whose data has been lost or breached and bear any costs associated with the notice or any mitigation.
H. POINTS OF CONTACT:

FOR SSA

San Francisco Regional Office:
Ellery Brown
Data Exchange Coordinator
Frank Hagel Federal Building
1221 Nevin Avenue
Richmond CA 94801
Phone: (510) 970-8243
Fax: (510) 970-8101
Email: Ellery.Brown@ssa.gov

Data Exchange Issues:
Guy Fortson
Office of Electronic Information Exchange
GD10 East High Rise
6401 Security Boulevard
Baltimore, MD 21235
Phone: (410) 597-1103
Fax: (410) 597-0841
Email: guy.fortson@ssa.gov

Systems Issues:
Pamela Riley
Office of Earnings, Enumeration & Administrative Systems
DIVES/Data Exchange Branch
6401 Security Boulevard
Baltimore, MD 21235
Phone: (410) 965-7993
Fax: (410) 966-3147
Email: Pamela.Riley@ssa.gov

Systems Security Issues:
Michael G. Johnson
Acting Director
Office of Electronic Information Exchange
Office of Strategic Services
6401 Security Boulevard
Baltimore, MD 21235
Phone: (410) 965-0266
Fax: (410) 966-0527
Email: Michael.G.Johnson@ssa.gov

FOR STATE AGENCY

Agreement Issues:
Manuel Urbina
Chief, Security Unit
Policy Operations Branch
Medi-Cal Eligibility Division
1501 Capitol Avenue, MS 4607
Sacramento, CA 95814
Phone: (916) 650-0160
Email: Manuel.Urbina@dhcs.ca.gov

Technical Issues:
Fei Collier
Chief, Application Support Branch
Information Technology Services Division
1615 Capitol Ave, MS 6100
Sacramento, CA 95814
Phone: (916) 440-7036
Email: Fei.Collier@dhcs.ca.gov

I. DURATION: The effective date of this IEA is January 1, 2010. This IEA will remain in effect for as long as: (1) a CMPPA Agreement governing this IEA is in effect between SSA and the State or the State Agency; and (2) the State Agency submits a certification in accordance with Section J. below at least 30 days before the expiration and renewal of such CMPPA Agreement.
J. CERTIFICATION AND PROGRAM CHANGES: At least 30 days before the expiration and renewal of the State CMPPA Agreement governing this IEA, the State Agency will certify in writing to SSA that: (1) it is in compliance with the terms and conditions of this IEA; (2) the data exchange processes under this IEA have been and will be conducted without change; and (3) it will, upon SSA's request, provide audit reports or other documents that demonstrate review and oversight activities. If there are substantive changes in any of the programs or data exchange processes listed in this IEA, the parties will modify the IEA in accordance with Section K. below and the State Agency will submit for SSA's approval new program questionnaires under Section C. above describing such changes prior to using SSA's data to administer such new or changed program.

K. MODIFICATION: Modifications to this IEA must be in writing and agreed to by the parties.

L. TERMINATION: The parties may terminate this IEA at any time upon mutual written consent. In addition, either party may unilaterally terminate this IEA upon 90 days advance written notice to the other party. Such unilateral termination will be effective 90 days after the date of the notice, or at a later date specified in the notice.

SSA may immediately and unilaterally suspend the data flow under this IEA, or terminate this IEA, if SSA, in its sole discretion, determines that the State Agency (including its employees, contractors, and agents) has: (1) made an unauthorized use or disclosure of SSA-supplied data; or (2) violated or failed to follow the terms and conditions of this IEA or the CMPPA Agreement.

M. INTEGRATION: This IEA, including all attachments, constitutes the entire agreement of the parties with respect to its subject matter. There have been no representations, warranties, or promises made outside of this IEA. This IEA shall take precedence over any other document that may be in conflict with it.

ATTACHMENTS
1 — CMPPA Agreement
2 — SSA Data Exchange Systems
3 — Systems Security Requirements for SSA Web Access to SSA Information Through ICON
4 — Information System Security Guidelines for Federal, State and Local Agencies Receiving Electronic Information from the Social Security Administration
5 — PII Loss Reporting Worksheet
N. SSA AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE: The signatory below warrants and represents that he or she has the competent authority on behalf of SSA to enter into the obligations set forth in this IEA.

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

[Signature]
Michael G. Gallagher
Assistant Deputy Commissioner
for Budget, Finance and Management

5/13/07
Date
O. REGIONAL AND STATE AGENCY SIGNATURES:

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
REGION IX

[Signature]
Peter D. Spencer
San Francisco Regional Commissioner

10/26/09
Date

THE CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH CARE SERVICES

The signatory below warrants and represents that he or she has the competent authority on behalf of the State Agency to enter into the obligations set forth in this IEA.

[Signature]
Toby Douglas
Chief Deputy Director, Health Care Programs

10/11/09
Date
CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE
FOR
THE INFORMATION EXCHANGE AGREEMENT
BETWEEN
THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (SSA)
AND
THE CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH CARE SERVICES (STATE AGENCY)
(State Agency Level)

In accordance with the terms of the Information Exchange Agreement (IEA/F) between SSA and the State Agency, the State Agency, through its authorized representative, hereby certifies that, as of the date of this certification:

1. The State Agency is in compliance with the terms and conditions of the IEA/F.

2. The State Agency has conducted the data exchange processes under the IEA/F without change, except as modified in accordance with the IEA/F.

3. The State Agency will continue to conduct the data exchange processes under the IEA/F without change, except as may be modified in accordance with the IEA/F.

4. Upon SSA’s request, the State Agency will provide audit reports or other documents that demonstrate compliance with the review and oversight activities required under the IEA/F and the governing Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act Agreement.

5. In compliance with the requirements of the “Electronic Information Exchange Security Requirements and Procedures for State and Local Agencies Exchanging Electronic Information with the Social Security Administration,” (last updated April 2014) Attachment 4 to the IEA/F, as periodically updated by SSA, the State Agency has not made any changes in the following areas that could potentially affect the security of SSA data:

- General System Security Design and Operating Environment
- System Access Control
- Automated Audit Trail
- Monitoring and Anomaly Detection
- Management Oversight
- Data and Communications Security
- Contractors of Electronic Information Exchange Partners

The State Agency will submit an updated Security Design Plan at least 30 days prior to making any changes to the areas listed above and provide updated contractor employee lists before allowing new employees’ access to SSA provided data.
6. The State Agency agrees that use of computer technology to transfer the data is more economical, efficient, and faster than using a manual process. As such, the State Agency will continue to utilize data exchange to obtain data it needs to administer the programs for which it is authorized under the IEA/F. Further, before directing an individual to an SSA field office to obtain data, the State Agency will verify that the information it submitted to SSA via data exchanges is correct, and verify with the individual that the information he/she supplied is accurate. The use of electronic data exchange expedites program administration and limits SSA field office traffic.

The signatory below warrants and represents that he or she is a representative of the State Agency duly authorized to make this certification on behalf of the State Agency.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH CARE SERVICES OF CALIFORNIA

[Signature]
Toby Douglas
Director

10/31/14
Date
ATTACHMENT 1

COMPUTER MATCHING AND PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT AGREEMENT
I. Purpose and Legal Authority

A. Purpose

This Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act (CMPPA) Agreement between the Social Security Administration (SSA) and the California Health and Human Services Agency (State Agency) sets forth the terms and conditions governing disclosures of records, information, or data (collectively referred to herein as “data”) made by SSA to the State Agency that administers federally funded benefit programs, including those under various provisions of the Social Security Act (Act), such as section 1137 (42 U.S.C. § 1320b-7), as well as the state-funded state supplementary payment programs under Title XVI of the Act. The terms and conditions of this Agreement ensure that SSA makes such disclosures of data, and the State Agency uses such disclosed data, in accordance with the requirements of the Privacy Act of 1974, as amended by the CMPPA of 1988, 5 U.S.C. § 552a.

Under section 1137 of the Act, the State Agency is required to use an income and eligibility verification system to administer specified federally funded benefit programs, including the state-funded state supplementary payment programs under Title XVI of the Act. To assist the State Agency in determining entitlement to and eligibility for benefits under those programs, as well as other federally funded benefit programs, SSA discloses certain data about applicants (and in limited circumstances, members of an applicant’s household), for state benefits from SSA Privacy Act Systems of Records (SOR) and verifies the Social Security numbers (SSN) of the applicants.

B. Legal Authority

SSA’s authority to disclose data and the State Agency’s authority to collect, maintain, and use data protected under SSA SORs for specified purposes is:

- Sections 1137, 453, and 1106(b) of the Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 1320b-7, 653, and 1306(b)) (income and eligibility verification data);
- 26 U.S.C. § 6103(l)(7) and (8) (tax return data);
- Section 202(x)(3)(B)(iv) of the Act (42 U.S.C. § 402(x)(3)(B)(iv)) (prisoner data);
• Section 1611(e)(1)(I)(i) of the Act (42 U.S.C. § 1382(e)(1)(I)(i)
(Supplemental Security Income (SSI));
• Section 205(r)(3) of the Act (42 U.S.C. § 405(r)(3)) and the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-458,
§ 7213(a)(2) (death data);
• Sections 402, 412, 421, and 435 of Pub. L. 104-193 (8 U.S.C. §§ 1612,
1622, 1631, and 1645) (quarters of coverage data);
• Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009
(CHIPRA), Pub. L. 111-3 (citizenship data); and
• Routine use exception to the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3) (data
necessary to administer other programs compatible with SSA programs).

This Agreement further carries out section 1106(a) of the Act (42 U.S.C. § 1306),
the regulations promulgated pursuant to that section (20 C.F.R. Part 401), the
Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. § 552a), as amended by the CMPPA, related Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) guidelines, the Federal Information Security
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) guidelines, which provide
the requirements that the State Agency must follow with regard to use, treatment,
and safeguarding of data.

II. Scope

A. The State Agency will comply with the terms and conditions of this Agreement
and the Privacy Act, as amended by the CMPPA.

B. The State Agency will execute one or more Information Exchange Agreements
(IEA) with SSA, documenting additional terms and conditions applicable to those
specific data exchanges, including the particular benefit programs administered by
the State Agency, the data elements that will be disclosed, and the data protection
requirements implemented to assist the State Agency in the administration of
those programs.

C. The State Agency will use the SSA data governed by this Agreement to determine
entitlement and eligibility of individuals for one or more of the following
programs:

1. Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program under Part A
of Title IV of the Act;
2. Medicaid provided under an approved State plan or an approved waiver under
Title XIX of the Act;
3. State Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) under Title XXI of
the Act, as amended by the Children’s Health Insurance Program
Reauthorization Act of 2009;
6. Medicare Savings Programs (MSP) under 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(10)(E);
7. Unemployment Compensation programs provided under a state law described in section 3304 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954;
8. Low Income Heating and Energy Assistance (LIHEAP or home energy grants) program under 42 U.S.C. § 8621;
9. State-administered supplementary payments of the type described in section 1616(a) of the Act;
10. Programs under a plan approved under Titles I, X, XIV, or XVI of the Act;
11. Foster Care and Adoption Assistance under Title IV of the Act;
12. Child Support Enforcement programs under section 453 of the Act (42 U.S.C. § 653);
13. Other applicable federally funded programs administered by the State Agency under Titles I, IV, X, XIV, XVI, XVIII, XIX, XX, and XXI of the Act; and
14. Any other federally funded programs administered by the State Agency that are compatible with SSA’s programs.

D. The State Agency will ensure that SSA data disclosed for the specific purpose of administering a particular federally funded benefit program is used only to administer that program.

III. Justification and Expected Results

A. Justification

This Agreement and related data exchanges with the State Agency are necessary for SSA to assist the State Agency in its administration of federally funded benefit programs by providing the data required to accurately determine entitlement and eligibility of individuals for benefits provided under these programs. SSA uses computer technology to transfer the data because it is more economical, efficient, and faster than using manual processes.

B. Expected Results

The State Agency will use the data provided by SSA to improve public service and program efficiency and integrity. The use of SSA data expedites the application process and ensures that benefits are awarded only to applicants that satisfy the State Agency’s program criteria. A cost-benefit analysis for the exchange made under this Agreement is not required in accordance with the determination by the SSA Data Integrity Board (DIB) to waive such analysis pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552a(u)(4)(B).
IV. Record Description

A. Systems of Records

SSA SORs used for purposes of the subject data exchanges include:

- 60-0058 -- Master Files of SSN Holders and SSN Applications;
- 60-0059 -- Earnings Recording and Self-Employment Income System;
- 60-0090 -- Master Beneficiary Record;
- 60-0103 -- Supplemental Security Income Record (SSR) and Special Veterans Benefits (SVB);
- 60-0269 -- Prisoner Update Processing System (PUPS); and
- 60-0321 -- Medicare Part D and Part D Subsidy File.

The State Agency will only use the tax return data contained in SOR 60-0059 (Earnings Recording and Self-Employment Income System) in accordance with 26 U.S.C. § 6103.

B. Data Elements

Data elements disclosed in computer matching governed by this Agreement are Personally Identifiable Information (PII) from specified SSA SORs, including names, SSNs, addresses, amounts, and other information related to SSA benefits and earnings information. Specific listings of data elements are available at:

http://www.ssa.gov/dataexchange/

C. Number of Records Involved

The number of records for each program covered under this Agreement is equal to the number of Title II, Title XVI, or Title XVIII recipients resident in the State as recorded in SSA’s Annual Statistical Supplement found on the Internet at:

http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/

This number will fluctuate during the term of this Agreement, corresponding to the number of Title II, Title XVI, and Title XVIII recipients added to, or deleted from, SSA databases.

V. Notice and Opportunity to Contest Procedures

A. Notice to Applicants

The State Agency will notify all individuals who apply for federally funded, state-administered benefits under the Act that any data they provide are subject to verification through computer matching with SSA. The State Agency and SSA
will provide such notice through appropriate language printed on application forms or separate handouts.

B. Notice to Beneficiaries/Recipients/Annuities

The State Agency will provide notice to beneficiaries, recipients, and annuitants under the programs covered by this Agreement informing them of ongoing computer matching with SSA. SSA will provide such notice through publication in the Federal Register and periodic mailings to all beneficiaries, recipients, and annuitants describing SSA's matching activities.

C. Opportunity to Contest

The State Agency will not terminate, suspend, reduce, deny, or take other adverse action against an applicant for or recipient of federally funded, state-administered benefits based on data disclosed by SSA from its SORs until the individual is notified in writing of the potential adverse action and provided an opportunity to contest the planned action. "Adverse action" means any action that results in a termination, suspension, reduction, or final denial of eligibility, payment, or benefit. Such notices will:

1. Inform the individual of the match findings and the opportunity to contest these findings;

2. Give the individual until the expiration of any time period established for the relevant program by a statute or regulation for the individual to respond to the notice. If no such time period is established by a statute or regulation for the program, a 30-day period will be provided. The time period begins on the date on which notice is mailed or otherwise provided to the individual to respond; and

3. Clearly state that, unless the individual responds to the notice in the required time period, the State Agency will conclude that the SSA data are correct and will effectuate the threatened action or otherwise make the necessary adjustment to the individual's benefit or entitlement.

VI. Records Accuracy Assessment and Verification Procedures

Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552a(p)(1)(A)(ii), SSA's DIB has determined that the State Agency may use SSA's benefit data without independent verification. SSA has independently assessed the accuracy of its benefits data to be more than 99 percent accurate when the benefit record is created.

Prisoner and death data, some of which is not independently verified by SSA, does not have the same degree of accuracy as SSA's benefit data. Therefore, the State
Agency must independently verify these data through applicable State verification procedures and the notice and opportunity to contest procedures specified in Section V of this Agreement before taking any adverse action against any individual.

Based on SSA’s Office of Quality Performance “FY 2009 Enumeration Quality Review Report #2—The ‘Numident’ (January 2011),” the SSA Enumeration System database (the Master Files of SSN Holders and SSN Applications System) used for SSN matching is 98 percent accurate for records updated by SSA employees.

Individuals applying for SSNs report their citizenship status at the time they apply for their SSNs. There is no obligation for an individual to report to SSA a change in his or her immigration status until he or she files for a Social Security benefit. The State Agency must independently verify citizenship data through applicable State verification procedures and the notice and opportunity to contest procedures specified in Section V of this Agreement before taking any adverse action against any individual.

VII. Disposition and Records Retention of Matched Items

A. The State Agency will retain all data received from SSA to administer programs governed by this Agreement only for the required processing times for the applicable federally funded benefit programs and will then destroy all such data.

B. The State Agency may retain SSA data in hardcopy to meet evidentiary requirements, provided that they retire such data in accordance with applicable state laws governing the State Agency’s retention of records.

C. The State Agency may use any accretions, deletions, or changes to the SSA data governed by this Agreement to update their master files of federally funded, state-administered benefit program applicants and recipients and retain such master files in accordance with applicable state laws governing the State Agency’s retention of records.

D. The State Agency may not create separate files or records comprised solely of the data provided by SSA to administer programs governed by this Agreement.

E. SSA will delete electronic data input files received from the State Agency after it processes the applicable match. SSA will retire its data in accordance with the Federal Records Retention Schedule (44 U.S.C. § 3303a).

VIII. Security Procedures

The State Agency will comply with the security and safeguarding requirements of the Privacy Act, as amended by the CMPPA, related OMB guidelines, FISMA, related
NIST guidelines, and the current revision of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Publication 1075, *Tax Information Security Guidelines for Federal, State and Local Agencies*, available at [http://www.irs.gov](http://www.irs.gov). In addition, the State Agency will have in place administrative, technical, and physical safeguards for the matched data and results of such matches. Additional administrative, technical, and physical security requirements governing all data SSA provides electronically to the State Agency, including specific guidance on safeguarding and reporting responsibilities for PII, are set forth in the IEAs.

### IX. Records Usage, Duplication, and Redisclosure Restrictions

A. The State Agency will use and access SSA data and the records created using that data only for the purpose of verifying eligibility for the specific federally funded benefit programs identified in the IEA.

B. The State Agency will comply with the following limitations on use, duplication, and redisclosure of SSA data:

1. The State Agency will not use or redisclose the data disclosed by SSA for any purpose other than to determine eligibility for, or the amount of, benefits under the state-administered income/health maintenance programs identified in this Agreement.

2. The State Agency will not extract information concerning individuals who are neither applicants for, nor recipients of, benefits under the state-administered income/health maintenance programs identified in this Agreement. In limited circumstances that are approved by SSA, the State Agency may extract information about an individual other than the applicant/recipient when the applicant/recipient has provided identifying information about the individual and the individual’s income or resources affect the applicant’s/recipient’s eligibility for such program.

3. The State Agency will not disclose to an applicant/recipient information about another individual (i.e., an applicant’s household member) without the written consent from the individual to whom the information pertains.

4. The State Agency will use the Federal tax information (FTI) disclosed by SSA only to determine individual eligibility for, or the amount of, assistance under a state plan pursuant to section 1137 programs and child support enforcement programs in accordance with 26 U.S.C. § 6103(l)(7) and (8). The State Agency receiving FTI will maintain all FTI from IRS in accordance with 26 U.S.C. § 6103(p)(4) and the IRS Publication 1075. Contractors and agents acting on behalf of the State Agency will only have access to tax return data where specifically authorized by 26 U.S.C. § 6103 and the current revision IRS Publication 1075.
5. The State Agency will use the citizenship status data disclosed by SSA under CHIPRA, Pub. L. 111-3, only for the purpose of determining entitlement to Medicaid and CHIP programs for new applicants.

6. The State Agency will restrict access to the data disclosed by SSA to only those authorized State employees, contractors, and agents who need such data to perform their official duties in connection with the purposes identified in this Agreement.

7. The State Agency will enter into a written agreement with each of its contractors and agents who need SSA data to perform their official duties whereby such contractor or agent agrees to abide by all relevant Federal laws, restrictions on access, use, and disclosure, and security requirements in this Agreement. The State Agency will provide its contractors and agents with copies of this Agreement, related IEAs, and all related attachments before initial disclosure of SSA data to such contractors and agents. Prior to signing this Agreement, and thereafter at SSA’s request, the State Agency will obtain from its contractors and agents a current list of the employees of such contractors and agents with access to SSA data and provide such lists to SSA.

8. The State Agency’s employees, contractors, and agents who access, use, or disclose SSA data in a manner or purpose not authorized by this Agreement may be subject to civil and criminal sanctions pursuant to applicable Federal statutes.

9. The State Agency will conduct triennial compliance reviews of its contractor(s) and agent(s) no later than three years after the initial approval of the security certification to SSA. The State Agency will share documentation of its recurring compliance reviews with its contractor(s) and agent(s) with SSA. The State Agency will provide documentation to SSA during its scheduled compliance and certification reviews or upon request.

C. The State Agency will not duplicate in a separate file or disseminate, without prior written permission from SSA, the data governed by this Agreement for any purpose other than to determine entitlement to, or eligibility for, federally funded benefits. The State Agency proposing the redisclosure must specify in writing to SSA what data are being disclosed, to whom, and the reasons that justify the redisclosure. SSA will not give permission for such redisclosure unless the redisclosure is required by law or essential to the conduct of the matching program and authorized under a routine use. To the extent SSA approves the requested redisclosure, the State Agency will ensure that any entity receiving the redisclosed data will comply with the procedures and limitations on use, duplication, and redisclosure of SSA data, as well as all administrative, technical, and physical security requirements governing all data SSA provides electronically to the State Agency including specific guidance on safeguarding and reporting.
responsibilities for PII, as set forth in this Agreement and the accompanying IEAs.

X. Comptroller General Access

The Comptroller General (the Government Accountability Office) may have access to all records of the State Agency that the Comptroller General deems necessary to monitor and verify compliance with this Agreement in accordance with 5 U.S.C. § 552a(o)(l)(K).

XI. Duration, Modification, and Termination of the Agreement

A. Duration

1. This Agreement is effective from January 1, 2015 (Effective Date) through June 30, 2016 (Expiration Date).

2. In accordance with the CMPPA, SSA will: (a) publish a Computer Matching Notice in the Federal Register at least 30 days prior to the Effective Date; (b) send required notices to the Congressional committees of jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C. § 552a(o)(2)(A)(i) at least 40 days prior to the Effective Date; and (c) send the required report to OMB at least 40 days prior to the Effective Date.

3. Within 3 months prior the Expiration Date, the SSA DIB may, without additional review, renew this Agreement for a period not to exceed 12 months, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552a(o)(2)(D), if:

   • the applicable data exchange will continue without any change; and
   • SSA and the State Agency certify to the DIB in writing that the applicable data exchange has been conducted in compliance with this Agreement.

4. If either SSA or the State Agency does not wish to renew this Agreement, it must notify the other party of its intent not to renew at least 3 months prior to the Expiration Date.

B. Modification

Any modification to this Agreement must be in writing, signed by both parties, and approved by the SSA DIB.
C. Termination

The parties may terminate this Agreement at any time upon mutual written consent of both parties. Either party may unilaterally terminate this Agreement upon 90 days advance written notice to the other party; such unilateral termination will be effective 90 days after the date of the notice, or at a later date specified in the notice.

SSA may immediately and unilaterally suspend the data flow or terminate this Agreement if SSA determines, in its sole discretion, that the State Agency has violated or failed to comply with this Agreement.

XII. Reimbursement

In accordance with section 1106(b) of the Act, the Commissioner of SSA has determined not to charge the State Agency the costs of furnishing the electronic data from the SSA SORs under this Agreement.

XIII. Disclaimer

SSA is not liable for any damages or loss resulting from errors in the data provided to the State Agency under any IEAs governed by this Agreement. Furthermore, SSA is not liable for any damages or loss resulting from the destruction of any materials or data provided by the State Agency.
XIV. Points of Contact

A. SSA Point of Contact

Regional Office
Dolores Dunnachie, Director
San Francisco Regional Office, Center for Programs Support
1221 Nevin Avenue
Richmond CA 94801
Phone: (510) 970-8444 Fax: (510) 970-8101
Dolores.Dunnachie@ssa.gov

B. State Agency Point of Contact

Sonia Herrera
California Health and Human Services Agency
1600 Ninth Street
Sacramento, CA 95814
Phone: (916) 654-3459 Fax: 916-440-5001
Sonja.Herrera@chhs.ca.gov
XV. SSA and Data Integrity Board Approval of Model CMPPA Agreement

The signatories below warrant and represent that they have the competent authority on behalf of SSA to approve the model of this CMPPA Agreement.

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

[Signature]
Dawn S. Wiggins
Deputy Executive Director
Office of Privacy and Disclosure
Office of the General Counsel

6-12-14
Date

I certify that the SSA Data Integrity Board approved the model of this CMPPA Agreement.

[Signature]
Kirsten J. Moncada
Chair
SSA Data Integrity Board

7-2-14
Date
XVI. Authorized Signatures

The signatories below warrant and represent that they have the competent authority on behalf of their respective agency to enter into the obligations set forth in this Agreement.

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

[Signature]
Grace M. Kim
Regional Commissioner
San Francisco

1/6/14
Date

HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY

[Signature]
Diana S. Dooley
Secretary

October 5, 2014
Date
RECERTIFICATION OF THE COMPUTER MATCHING AGREEMENT
BETWEEN
THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
AND
THE HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY OF CALIFORNIA

SSA Match #6003

Under the applicable provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974, amended by the Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act (CMPPA) of 1988, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(o)(2), a computer matching agreement (Agreement) will remain in effect for a period not to exceed 18 months. Within 3 months prior to the expiration of such Agreement, however, the Data Integrity Board (DIB) may, without additional review, renew the Agreement for a current, ongoing matching program for a period not to exceed 12 additional months if:

1. such program will be conducted without any changes; and

2. each party to the Agreement certifies to the DIB in writing that the program has been conducted in compliance with the Agreement.

The following match meets the conditions for renewal by this recertification:

I. TITLE OF MATCH:

Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act Agreement Between the Social Security Administration and the Health and Human Services Agency of California (Match #6003)

II. PARTIES TO THE MATCH:

Recipient Agency: Health and Human Services Agency of California (State Agency)

Source Agency: Social Security Administration (SSA)

III. PURPOSE OF THE AGREEMENT:

This Agreement between SSA and the State Agency sets forth the terms and conditions governing disclosures of records, information, or data (collectively referred to herein as “data”) made by SSA to the State Agency that administers federally funded benefit programs, including those under various provisions of the Social Security Act (Act), such as section 1137 (42 U.S.C. § 1320b-7), as well as the state-funded state supplementary payment programs under Title XVI of the Act. The terms and conditions of this Agreement ensure that SSA makes such disclosures of data, and the State Agency uses such disclosed data, in accordance with the requirements of the Privacy Act of 1974, as amended by the CMPPA of 1988, 5 U.S.C. § 552a.
Under section 1137 of the Act, the State Agency is required to use an income and eligibility verification system to administer specified federally funded benefit programs, including the state-funded state supplementary payment programs under Title XVI of the Act. To assist the State Agency in determining entitlement to and eligibility for benefits under those programs, as well as other federally funded benefit programs, SSA discloses certain data about applicants (and in limited circumstances, members of an applicant’s household), for state benefits from SSA Privacy Act Systems of Records and verifies the Social Security numbers of the applicants.

IV. ORIGINAL EFFECTIVE AND EXPIRATION DATES OF THE MATCH:

Effective Date: January 1, 2015
Expiration Date: June 30, 2016

V. RENEWAL AND NEW EXPIRATION DATES:

Renewal Date: July 1, 2016
New Expiration Date: June 30, 2017

VI. CHANGES:

By this recertification, SSA and the State Agency make the following non-substantive changes to the Agreement:

In Article XIV, **Points of Contact,** information under subsection A., “SSA Point of Contact, Regional Office,” should be deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following:

Jamie Lucero, Director
San Francisco Regional Office, Center for Disability and Programs Support
1221 Nevin Ave.
Richmond, CA 94801
Phone: (510) 970-8297/ Fax: (510) 970-8101
Jamie.Lucero@ssa.gov
VII. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION SIGNATURES:

Source Agency Certification:

As the authorized representative of the source agency named above, I certify that: (1) the subject matching program was conducted in compliance with the existing computer matching agreement between the parties; and (2) the subject matching program will continue without any change for an additional 12 months, subject to the approval of the Data Integrity Board of the Social Security Administration.

[Signature]
Grace M. Kim
Regional Commissioner
San Francisco Region
Date 5/25/16

Data Integrity Board Certification:

As Chair of the Data Integrity Board of the source agency named above, I certify that: (1) the subject matching program was conducted in compliance with the existing computer matching agreement between the parties; and (2) the subject matching program will continue without any change for an additional 12 months.

[Signature]
Glenn Sklar
Acting Chair
Data Integrity Board
Date 3/3/16
VIII. HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY of CALIFORNIA SIGNATURES:

Recipient Agency Certification:

As the authorized representative of the recipient agency named above, I certify that: (1) the subject matching program was conducted in compliance with the existing computer matching agreement between the parties; and (2) the subject matching program will continue without any change for an additional 12 months, subject to the approval of the Data Integrity Board of the Social Security Administration.

Diana S. Dooley, Secretary

Date May 5, 2016
ATTACHMENT 2

AUTHORIZED DATA EXCHANGE SYSTEM(S)
Authorized Data Exchange System(s)

**BEER (Beneficiary Earnings Exchange Record):** Employer data for the last calendar year.

**BENDEX (Beneficiary and Earnings Data Exchange):** Primary source for Title II eligibility, benefit and demographic data.

**EVS (Enumeration Verification System):** This verification system provides some agencies with verification of Social Security number, names, and date of birth.

**LIS (Low-Income Subsidy):** Data from the Low-Income Subsidy Application for Medicare Part D beneficiaries -- used for Medicare Savings Programs (MSP).

**Medicare 1144 (Outreach):** Lists of individuals on SSA roles, who may be eligible for medical assistance for payment of the cost of Medicare cost-sharing under the Medicaid program pursuant to Sections 1902(a)(10)(E) and 1933 of the Act; transitional assistance under Section 1860D-31(f) of the Act; or premiums and cost-sharing subsidies for low-income individuals under Section 1860D-14 of the Act.

**PUPS (Prisoner Update Processing System):** Confinement data received from over 2000 state and local institutions (such as jails, prisons, or other penal institutions or correctional facilities) -- PUPS matches the received data with the MBR and SSR benefit data and generates alerts for review/action.

**QUARTERS OF COVERAGE (QC):** Quarters of Coverage data as assigned and described under Title II of the Act -- The term "quarters of coverage" is also referred to as "credits" or "Social Security credits" in various SSA public information documents, as well as to refer to "qualifying quarters" to determine entitlement to receive Food Stamps.

**SDX (SSI State Data Exchange):** Primary source of Title XVI eligibility, benefit and demographic data as well as data for Title VIII Special Veterans Benefits (SVB).

**SOLQ/SOLQ-l (State On-line Query/State On-line Query-Internet):** A real-time online system that provides SSN verification and MBR and SSR benefit data similar to data provided through SVES. SOLQ/Citizenship* or SOLQ-l/Citizenship* transmissions provide strictly SSN verification and confirm consistency of citizenship data as recorded in our records.

**SVES (State Verification and Exchange System):** A batch system that provides SSN verification, MBR benefit information, and SSR information through a uniform data response based on authorized user-initiated queries. The SVES types are divided into four different responses as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SVES I:</th>
<th>This batch provides strictly SSN verification.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SVES I/Citizenship*</td>
<td>This batch provides strictly SSN verification and confirms consistency of citizenship data, as recorded in our records.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SVES II: This batch provides strictly SSN verification and MBR benefit information.

SVES III: This batch provides strictly SSN verification and SSR/SVB.

SVES IV: This batch provides SSN verification, MBR benefit information, and SSR/SVB information, which represents all available SVES data.

*Confirmation of consistency of citizenship status data, as recorded in SSA’s records, is disclosed by SSA under the Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111-3, only for the purpose of determining entitlement to Medicaid and CHIP program for new applicants.

Note: In cases where one of these data exchange systems are not used, a custom exchange may be put in place.
ATTACHMENT 3 OMITTED
SENSITIVE DOCUMENT

ATTACHMENT 4

ELECTRONIC INFORMATION EXCHANGE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AND PROCEDURES

This document is SENSITIVE and should not be released to the public without prior authorization from DHCS.
ELECTRONIC INFORMATION EXCHANGE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AND PROCEDURES FOR STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES EXCHANGING ELECTRONIC INFORMATION WITH THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

SENSITIVE DOCUMENT

Version 7.0
July 2015
TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction
2. Electronic Information Exchange (EIE) Definition
3. Roles and Responsibilities
4. General Systems Security Standards
5. Systems Security Requirements
   5.1 Overview
   5.2 General System Security Design and Operating Environment
   5.3 System Access Control
   5.4 Automated Audit Trail
   5.5 Personally Identifiable Information (PII)
   5.6 Monitoring and Anomaly Detection
   5.7 Management Oversight and Quality Assurance
   5.8 Data and Communications Security
   5.9 Incident Reporting
   5.10 Security Awareness and Employee Sanctions
   5.11 Contractors of Electronic Information Exchange Partners
   5.12 Cloud Service Providers (CSP) for Electronic Information Exchange Partners
6. Security Certification and Compliance Review Programs
   6.1 The Security Certification Program
   6.2 Documenting Security Controls in the Security Design Plan (SDP)
     6.2.1 When the SDP is Required
   6.3 The Certification Process
   6.4 The Compliance Review Program and Process
     6.5.1 EIEP Compliance Review Participation
   6.6 Scheduling the Onsite Review
7. Additional Definitions
8. Regulatory References
9. Frequently Asked Questions
1. Introduction

Federal standards require the Social Security Administration (SSA) to maintain oversight of the information it provides to its **Electronic Information Exchange Partners (EIEPs)**. EIEPs must protect the information with efficient and effective security controls. EIEPs are entities that have electronic information exchange agreements with the agency.

This document consistently references the concept of **Electronic Information Exchange Partners (EIEP)**; however, our **Compliance Review Questionnaire (CRQ)** and **Security Design Plan (SDP)** documents will use the terms “state agency” or “state agency, contractor(s), and agent(s)” for clarity. Most state officials and agreement signatories are not familiar with the acronym EIEP; therefore, SSA will continue to use the terms “state agency” or “state agency, contractor(s), and agent(s)” in the same manner as the Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act (CMPPA) and Information Exchange Agreements (IEA). This allows for easier alignment and mapping back to our data exchange agreements between state agencies and SSA. It will also provide a more “user-friendly” experience for the state officials who complete these forms on behalf of their state agencies.

The objective of this document is twofold. The first is to ensure that SSA can properly certify EIEPs as compliant with SSA security standards, requirements, and procedures. The second is to ensure that EIEPs adequately safeguard electronic information provided to them by SSA.

This document helps EIEPs understand the criteria that SSA uses when evaluating and certifying the system design and security features used for electronic access to SSA-provided information. Finally, this document provides the framework and general procedures for SSA’s Security Certification and Compliance Review Programs.

The primary statutory authority that supports the information contained in this document is the **Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA)**. FISMA became law as part of the **Electronic Government Act of 2002**. FISMA is the United States legislation that defines a comprehensive framework to protect government information, operations, and assets against natural or manufactured threats. FISMA assigned the **National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)**, a branch of the U.S. Department of Commerce, the responsibility to outline and define compliance with FISMA. Unless otherwise stated, all of SSA’s requirements mirror the NIST-defined management, operational, and technical controls listed in the various NIST Special Publications (SP) libraries of technical guidance documents.

To gain electronic access to SSA-provided information, under the auspices of a data exchange agreement, EIEP’s must comply with SSA’s most current **Technical System Security Requirements** (hereafter referred to as TSSRs) to gain access to SSA-provided information. This document is synonymous with the **Electronic Information Exchange Security Requirements and Procedures for State and**
Local Agencies Exchanging Electronic Information with the Social Security Administration in the agreements. The TSSR specifies minimally acceptable levels of security standards and controls to protect SSA-provided information. SSA maintains the TSSR as a living document—subject to change—that addresses emerging threats, new attack methods, and the development of new technology that potentially places SSA-provided information at risk. EIEPs may proactively ensure their ongoing compliance to the TSSR by periodically requesting the most current version from SSA. SSA will work with EIEPs to resolve deficiencies, which result from updates to the TSSRs. SSA refers to this process as Gap Analysis. EIEPs may proactively ensure their ongoing compliance with the TSSRs by periodically requesting the most current TSSR package from their SSA Point of Contact (POC) from the data exchange agreement.

SSA’s standard for categorization of information (Moderate) and information systems is to provide appropriate levels of security according to risk level. Additions, deletions, or modification of security controls directly affect the level of security and due diligence SSA requires EIEPs use to mitigate risks. The emergence of new threats, attack methods, and the development of new technology warrants frequent reviews and revisions to our TSSR. Consequently, EIEPs should expect SSA’s TSSR to evolve in harmony with the industry.

2. Electronic Information Exchange (EIE) Definition

For discussion purposes herein, EIE is any electronic process in which SSA discloses information under its control to any third party for program or non-program purposes, without the specific consent of the subject individual or any agent acting on his or her behalf. EIE involves individual data transactions and data files processed within the programmatic systems of parties to electronic information sharing agreements with SSA. This includes direct terminal access (DTA) to SSA systems, batch processing, and variations thereof (e.g., online query) regardless of the systematic method used to accomplish the activity or to interconnect SSA with the EIEP.

3. Roles and Responsibilities

The SSA Office of Information Security (OIS) has agency-wide responsibility for interpreting, developing, and implementing security policy; providing security and integrity review requirements for all major SSA systems; managing SSA's fraud monitoring and reporting activities, developing and disseminating security training and awareness materials, and providing consultation and support for a variety of agency initiatives. SSA's security reviews ensure that external systems receiving information from SSA are secure and operate in a manner consistent with SSA's Information Technology (IT) security policies and in compliance with the terms of electronic data exchange agreements executed by SSA with outside entities. Within the context of SSA’s security policies and the terms of the electronic data exchange
agreements with SSA’s EIEPs, SSA exclusively conducts and brings to closure initial security certifications and triennial security compliance reviews. This includes (but not limited to) any EIEP that processes, maintains, transmits, or stores SSA-provided information in accordance with pertinent Federal requirements.

a. The SSA Regional Data Exchange Coordinators (DECs) serve as a bridge between SSA and EIEPs. DECs assist in coordinating data exchange security review activities with EIEPs; (e.g., providing points of contact with state agencies, assisting in setting up security reviews, etc.) DECs are also the first points of contact for states if an employee of a state agency or an employee of a state agency’s contractor or agent becomes aware of suspected or actual loss of SSA-provided information.

b. SSA requires EIEPs to adhere to the standards, requirements, and procedures, published in this TSSR document.

- “Personally Identifiable Information (PII),” covered under several Federal laws and statutes, refers to specific information about an individual used to trace that individual’s identity. Information such as his/her name, Social Security Number (SSN), date and place of birth, mother’s maiden name, or biometric records, alone, or when combined with other personal or identifying information is linkable or lined to a specific individual’s medical, educational, financial, and employment information.

- The data (last 4 digits of the SSN) that SSA provides to its EIEPs for purposes of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) does not identify a specific individual; therefore, is not “PII” as defined by the Act.

- Both SSA and EIEPs must remain diligent in the responsibility for establishing appropriate management, operational, and technical safeguards to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its records and to protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to their security or integrity.

c. A State Transmission/Transfer Component (STC) is an organization that performs as an electronic information conduit or collection point for one of more other entities (also referred to as a hub). An STC must also adhere to the same management, operational and technical controls as SSA and the EIEP.

**NOTE: Disclosure of Federal Tax Information (FTI) is limited to certain Federal agencies and state programs supported by federal statutes under Sections 1137, 453, and 1106 of the Social Security Act. For information regarding**

4. General Systems Security Standards

EIEPs that request and receive information electronically from SSA must comply with the following general systems security standards concerning access to and control of SSA-provided information.

**NOTE:** EIEPs may not create separate files or records comprised solely of the information provided by SSA.

1. EIEPs must ensure that means, methods, and technology used to process, maintain, transmit, or store SSA-provided information neither prevents nor impedes the EIEP’s ability to:
   - safeguard the information in conformance with SSA requirements
   - efficiently investigate fraud, data breaches, or security events that involve SSA-provided information
   - detect instances of misuse or abuse of SSA-provided information

   For example, Utilization of cloud computing may have the potential to jeopardize an EIEP’s compliance with the terms of their agreement or associated systems security requirements and procedures.

2. The EIEP must use the electronic connection established between the EIEP and SSA only in support of the current agreement(s) between the EIEP and SSA.

3. The EIEP must use the software and/or devices provided to the EIEPs only in support of the current agreement(s) between the EIEPs and SSA.

4. SSA prohibits the EIEP from modifying any software or devices provided to the EIEPs by SSA.

5. EIEPs must ensure that SSA-provided information is not processed, maintained, transmitted, or stored in or by means of data communications channels, electronic devices, computers, or computer networks located in geographic or virtual areas not subject to U.S. law.

6. EIEPs must restrict access to the information to authorized users who need it to perform their official duties.

   **NOTE:** Contractors and agents (hereafter referred to as contractors) of the EIEP who process, maintain, transmit, or store SSA-provided information are held to the same security requirements as employees of the EIEP. Refer to the section ‘Contractors of Electronic Information Exchange Partners in the Systems Security Requirements for additional information.

7. EIEPs must store information received from SSA in a manner that, at all times, is
physically and electronically secure from access by unauthorized persons.

8. The EIEP must process SSA-provided information under the immediate supervision and control of authorized personnel.

9. EIEPs must employ both physical and technological barriers to prevent unauthorized retrieval of SSA-provided information via computer, remote terminal, or other means.

10. EIEPs must have formal PII incident response procedures. When faced with a security incident, caused by malware, unauthorized access, software issues, or acts of nature, the EIEP must be able to respond in a manner that protects SSA-provided information affected by the incident.

11. EIEPs must have an active and robust security awareness program, which is mandatory for all employees who access SSA-provided information.

12. EIEPs must advise employees with access to SSA-provided information of the confidential nature of the information, the safeguards required to protecting the information, and the civil and criminal sanctions for non-compliance contained in the applicable Federal and state laws.

13. In accordance with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication (SP) on Contingency Planning requirements and recommendations, SSA requires EIEPs to document a senior management approved Contingency plan that includes a disaster recovery plan that addresses both natural disaster and cyber-attack situations.

14. SSA requires the Contingency Plan to include details regarding the organizational business continuity plan (BCP) and a business impact analyses (BIA) that address the security of SSA-provided information if a disaster occurs.

15. At its discretion, SSA or its designee must have the option to conduct onsite security reviews or make other provisions, to ensure that EIEPs maintain adequate security controls to safeguard the information we provide.

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5. Systems Security Requirements

5.1 Overview

SSA’s TSSR represent the current industry standard for security controls, safeguards, and countermeasures required for Federal information systems by Federal regulations, statutes, standards, and guidelines. Additionally, SSA’s TSSR includes organizationally defined interpretations, policies, and procedures mandated by the authority of the Commissioner of Social Security in areas when or where other cited authorities may be silent or non-specific.

SSA must certify that the EIEP has implemented security controls that meet the requirements and work as intended, before the authorization to initiate transactions to and from SSA, through batch data exchange processes or online processes such as State Online Query (SOLQ) or Internet SOLQ (SOLQ-I).

The TSSR address management, operational, and technical controls regarding security safeguards to ensure only authorized disclosure and usage of SSA provided information used, maintained, transmitted, or stored by SSA’s EIEPs. SSA requires EIEPs to maintain an organizational access control structure that adheres to a three-tiered best practices model. The SSA recommended model is “separation of duties,” “need-to-know” and “least privilege.”

SSA requires EIEPs to document and notify SSA prior to sharing SSA-provided information with another state entity, or to allow them direct access to their system. This includes (but not limited to) law enforcement, other state agencies, and state organizations that perform audit, quality, or integrity functions.

SSA recommends that the EIEP develop and publish a comprehensive Information Technology (IT) Systems Security Policy document that specifically addresses:

1) the classification of information processed and stored within the network,

2) management, operational, and technical controls to protect the information stored and processed within the network,

3) access to the various systems and subsystems within the network,

4) Security Awareness Training,
5) Employee and End User Sanctions Policy.
6) Contingency Planning and Disaster Recovery

7) Incident Response Policy, and

8) The disposal of protected information and sensitive documents derived from
the system or subsystems on the network.

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5.2 General System Security Design and Operating Environment

(Planning (PL) Family – (System Security Plan), Contingency Plan (CP)
Family, Physical and Environmental (PE) Family,
NIST SP 800-53 rev. 4)

In accordance with the NIST suite of Special Publications (SP) (e.g., 800-53,
800-34, etc.), SSA requires the EIEP to maintain policies, procedures,
descriptions, and explanations of their overall system design, configuration,
security features, and operational environment. They should include
explanations of how they conform to SSA’s TSSRs. The EIEPs General System
Security design and Operating Environment must also address:

a) the operating environment(s) in which the EIEP will utilize,
maintain, store, and transmit SSA-provided information,

b) the business process(es) in which the EIEP will use SSA-provided
information,

c) the physical safeguards employed to ensure that unauthorized
personnel, the public or visitors to the agency cannot access SSA-
provided information,


d) details of how the EIEP keeps audit information pertaining to the use
and access to SSA-provided information and associated applications
readily available,

e) electronic safeguards, methods, and procedures for protecting the
EIEP’s network infrastructure and for protecting SSA-provided
information while in transit, in use within a process or application,
and at rest,

f) a senior management approved Information System Contingency
Plan (ISCP) that addresses both internal and external threats. SSA
requires the ISCP to include details regarding the organizational
business continuity plan (BCP) and a business impact analyses
(BIA) that addresses the security of SSA-provided information if a
disaster occurs. SSA recommends that state agencies perform
disaster exercises at least once annually.,
g) how the EIEP prevents unauthorized retrieval of SSA-provided information by computer, remote terminal, or other means; including descriptions of security software other than access control software (e.g., security patch and anti-malware software installation and maintenance, etc.)

h) how the configurations of devices (e.g., servers, workstations, portable devices) involving SSA-provided information complies with recognized industry standards (i.e. NIST SP’s) and SSA’s TSSR, and

i) organizational structure of the agency, number of users, and all external entities that will have access to the system and/or application that displays, transmits, and/or application that displays, transmits and/or stores SSA-provided information.

Note: At its discretion, SSA or a third party (i.e. contractor) must have the option to conduct onsite security reviews or make other provisions, to ensure that EIEPs maintain adequate security controls to safeguard the information we provide.

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5.3 System Access Control

(Access Control (AC) Family, NIST SP 800-53 rev. 4)

EIEPs must utilize and maintain technological (logical) access controls that limit access to SSA-provided information and associated transactions and functions to only those users, processes acting on behalf of authorized users, or devices (including other information systems) authorized for such access based on their official duties or purpose(s). EIEPs must employ a recognized user-access security software package (e.g., RAC-F, ACF-2, TOP SECRET, Active Directory, etc.) or a security software design, which is equivalent to such products. The access control software must employ and enforce (1) PIN/password, and/or (2) PIN/biometric identifier, and/or (3) SmartCard/biometric identifier, etc., (for authenticating users), (and lower case letters, numbers, and special characters; password phrases) for the user accounts of persons, processes, or devices whose functions require access privileges in excess of those of ordinary users.

The EIEP’s password policies must require stringent password construction as supported by current NIST guidelines for the user accounts of persons, processes, or devices whose functions require access privileges above those of ordinary users. SSA strongly recommends Two-Factor Authentication.

The EIEP’s implementation of the control software must comply with recognized industry standards. Password policies should enforce sufficient construction strength (length and complexity) to defeat or minimize risk-based identified vulnerabilities and ensure limitations for password repetition. Technical controls should enforce periodic password changes based on a risk-based standard (e.g., maximum password age of 90 days, minimum password age of 3 - 7 days) and enforce automatic disabling of user accounts that have been inactive for a specified period of time (e.g., 90 days).

The EIEP’s password policies must require stringent password construction (e.g., passwords greater than eight characters in length requiring upper and lower case letters, numbers, and/or special characters; password phrases) for the user accounts of persons, processes, or devices whose functions require access privileges in excess of those of ordinary users.
In addition, SSA has the following specific requirements in the area of Access Control:

1. Upon hiring or before granting access to SSA-provided information, EIEPs should verify the identities of any employees, contractors, and agents who will have access to SSA-provided information in accordance with the applicable agency or state’s “personnel identity verification policy.”

2. SSA requires that state agencies have a logical control feature that designates a maximum number of unsuccessful login attempts for agency workstations and devices that store or process SSA-provided information, in accordance with NIST guidelines. SSA recommends no fewer than three (3) and no greater than five (5).\

3. SSA requires that the state agency designate specific official(s) or functional component(s) to issue PINs, passwords, biometric identifiers, or Personal Identity Verification (PIV) credentials to individuals who will access SSA-provided information. **SSA also requires that the state agency prohibit any functional component(s) or official(s) from issuing credentials or access authority to themselves or other individuals within their job-function or category of access.**

4. SSA requires that EIEPs grant access to SSA-provided information based on least privilege, need-to-know, and separation of duties. State agencies should not routinely grant employees, contractors, or agents access privileges that exceed the organization’s business needs. **SSA also requires that EIEPs periodically review employees, contractors, and agent’s system access to determine if the same levels and types of access remain applicable.**

5. If an EIEP employee, contractor, or agent is subject to an adverse administrative action by the EIEP (e.g., reduction in pay, disciplinary action, termination of employment), SSA recommends the EIEP remove his or her access to SSA-provided information in advance of the adverse action to reduce the possibility that will the employee will perform unauthorized activities that involve SSA-provided information.
6. SSA requires that work-at-home, remote access, and/or Internet access comply with applicable Federal and state security policy and standards. Furthermore, the EIEPs access control policy must define the safeguards in place to adequately protect SSA-provided information for work-at-home, remote access, and/or Internet access.

7. SSA requires EIEPs to design their system with logical control(s) that prevent unauthorized browsing of SSA-provided information. SSA refers to this setup as a Permission Module. The term “Permission Module” supports a business rule and systematic control that prevents users from browsing a system that contains SSA-provided information. It also supports the principle of referential integrity. It should prevent non-business related or unofficial access to SSA-provided information. Before a user or process requests SSA-provided information for verification, the system should verify it is an authorized transaction. Some organizations use the term “referential integrity” to describe the verification step. A properly configured Permission Module should prevent a user from performing any actions not consistent with a need-to-know business process. If a logical permission module configuration is not possible, the state agency must enforce its Access Control List (ACL) in accordance with the principle of least privilege. The only acceptable compensating control for a system that lacks a permission module is a 100% review of all transactions that involve SSA-provided information.
5.4 Automated Audit Trail  
*(Audit and Accountability (AU) Family, NIST SP 800-53 rev. 4)*

SSA requires EIEPs, and other STCs or agencies that provide audit trail services to other state agencies that receive information electronically from SSA, to implement and maintain a fully automated audit trail system (ATS). The system must be capable of creating, storing, protecting, and (efficiently) retrieving and collecting records identifying the individual user who initiates a request for information from SSA or accesses SSA-provided information. At a minimum, individual audit trail records must contain the data needed (including date and time stamps) to associate each query transaction or access to SSA-provided information with its initiator, their action, if any, and the relevant business purpose/process (e.g., SSN verification for Medicaid). Each entry in the audit file must be stored as a separate record, not overlaid by subsequent records. The ATS must create transaction files to capture all input from interactive internet applications that access or query SSA-provided information.

SSA requires that the agency’s ATS create an audit record when users view screens that contain SSA-provided information. If an STC handles and audits the EIEP’s transactions with SSA, the EIEP is responsible for ensuring that the STC’s audit capabilities meet NIST’s guidelines for an automated audit trail system. The EIEP must also establish a process to obtain specific audit information from the STC regarding the EIEP’s SSA transactions.

SSA requires that EIEPs have automated retrieval and collection of audit records. Such automated functions can be via online queries, automated reports, batch processing, or any other logical means of delivering audit records in an expeditious manner. Information in the audit file must be retrievable by an automated method and must allow the EIEP the capability to make them available to SSA upon request.

Access to the audit file must be restricted to authorized users with a “need to know,” audit file data must be unalterable (read-only), and maintained for a minimum of three (3) (preferably seven (7)) years. Information in the audit file must be retrievable by an automated method and must allow the EIEP the capability to make them available to SSA upon request. The EIEP must backup audit trail records on a regular basis to ensure its availability. EIEPs must apply the same level of protection to backup audit files that apply to the original files to ensure the integrity of the data.
If the EIEP retains SSA-provided information in a database (e.g., Access database, SharePoint, etc.), or if certain data elements within the EIEP’s system indicates to users that SSA verified the information, the EIEP’s system must also capture an audit trail record of users who view SSA-provided information stored within the EIEP’s system. The retrieval requirements for SSA-provided information at rest and the retrieval requirements for regular transactions are identical. **Similar to the Permission Module requirement above, the only acceptable compensating control for a system that lacks an Automated Audit Trail System (ATS) is a 100% review of all transactions that involve SSA-provided information.**

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5.5 Personally Identifiable Information (PII)

(The Privacy Act of 1974, E-Government Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-347), and AP Family – Authority and Purpose (Privacy Controls),
NIST SP 800-53 rev. 4)

**Personally Identifiable Information (PII)** is information used to distinguish or trace an individual’s identity, such as their name, Social Security Number, biometric records, alone or when combined with other personal or identifying information linked or linkable to a specific individual. An item such as date and place of birth, mother’s maiden name, or father’s surname is PII, regardless of whether combined with other data.

SSA defines a **PII loss** as a circumstance when an EIEP employee, contractor, or agent has reason to believe that information on hard copy or in electronic format, which contains PII provided by SSA, left the EIEP’s custody or the EIEP disclosed it to an unauthorized individual or entity. PII loss is a reportable incident. SSA requires that contracts for periodic disposal/destruction of case files or other print media contain a non-disclosure agreement signed by all personnel who will encounter products that contain SSA-provided information.

If a PII loss involving SSA-provided information occurs or is suspected, the EIEP must be able to quantify the extent of the loss and compile a complete list of the individuals potentially affected by the incident (refer to *Incident Reporting*).

The EIEP should have procedural documents to describe methods and controls for safeguarding SSA-provided PII while in use, at rest, during transmission, or after archiving. The document should explain how the EIEP manages and handles SSA-provided information on print media and explain how the methods and controls conform to NIST requirements. SSA requires that printed items that contain SSA-provided PII always remain in the custody of authorized EIEP employees, contractors, or agents. SSA also requires that the agency destroy the items when no longer required for the EIEP’s business process. If retained in paper files for evidentiary purposes, the EIEP should safeguard such PII in a manner that prevents unauthorized personnel from accessing such materials. All agencies that receive SSA-provided information must maintain an inventory of all documents that outline statewide or agency policy and procedures regarding the same.
5.6 Monitoring and Anomaly Detection

*Information Security Continuous Monitoring (ISCM) for Federal Information Systems and Organizations, NIST SP 800-137, E-Government Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-347), and Security Assessment and Authorization (CA) and Risk Assessment (RA) Families, NIST SP 800-53 rev. 4*

**SSA requires that the EIEPs use an Intrusion Protection System (IPS) or an Intrusion Detection System (IDS).** The EIEP must establish and/or maintain continuous monitoring of its network infrastructure and assets to ensure that:

1) the EIEP’s security controls continue to be effective over time,

2) the EIEP uses industry-standard Security Information Event Manager (SIEM) tools, anti-malware software, and effective antivirus protection,

3) only authorized individuals, devices, and processes have access to SSA-provided information,

4) the EIEP detects efforts by external and internal entities, devices, or processes to perform unauthorized actions (e.g., data breaches, malicious attacks, access to network assets, software/hardware installations, etc.) as soon as they occur,

5) the necessary parties are immediately alerted to unauthorized actions performed by external and internal entities, devices, or processes,

6) upon detection of unauthorized actions, measures are immediately initiated to prevent or mitigate associated risk,

7) in the event of a data breach or security incident, the EIEP can efficiently determine and initiate necessary remedial actions, and

8) trends, patterns, or anomalous occurrences and behavior in user or network activity that may be indicative of potential security issues are readily discernible.
The EIEP’s system must include the capability to prevent users from unauthorized browsing of SSA records. SSA requires the use of a transaction-driven permission module design, whereby employees are unable to initiate transactions not associated with the normal business process. If the EIEP uses such a design, they also must have anomaly detection to monitor an employee’s unauthorized attempts to gain access to SSA-provided information and attempts to obtain information from SSA for clients not in the EIEP’s client system. The EIEP should employ measures to ensure the permission module’s integrity. Users should not be able to create a bogus case and subsequently delete it in such a manner that it goes undetected. The SSA permission module design employs both role and rules based logical access control restrictions. (Refer to Access Control)

If the EIEP’s design does not use a permission module and is not transaction-driven, until at least one of these security features exists, the EIEP must develop and implement compensating security controls to deter employees from browsing SSA records. These controls must include monitoring and anomaly detection features, such as: systematic, manual, or a combination thereof. Such features must include the capability to detect anomalies in the volume and/or type of transactions or queries requested or initiated by individuals and include systematic or manual procedures for verifying that requests and queries of SSA-provided information comply with valid official business purposes.

Risk Management Program

SSA recommends that EIEPs develop and maintain a published Risk Assessment Policy and Procedures document. A Risk Management Program may include, but is not limited to the following:

1. A risk assessment policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance,

2. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the risk assessment policy and associated risk assessment controls,

3. A function that conducts an assessment of risk, including the likelihood and magnitude of harm, from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of the information system and the information it processes, stores, or transmits,

4. An independent function that conducts vulnerability and risk assessments, reviews risk assessment results, and disseminates such information to senior management,

5. A firm commitment from senior management to update the risk assessment whenever there are significant changes to the information
system or environment of operation or other conditions that may affect the security of SSA-provided information,

6. A robust vulnerability scanning protocol that employs industry standard scanning tools and techniques that facilitate interoperability among tools and automates parts of the vulnerability management process,

7. Remediates legitimate vulnerabilities in accordance with an organizational assessment of risk, and

8. Shares information obtained from the vulnerability scanning process and security control assessments with senior management to help eliminate similar vulnerabilities in other information systems that receive, process, transmit, or store SSA-provided information.

Note: The EIEP’s decision to initiate or maintain an official Risk Management Program and establish a formal Risk Assessment Strategy for mitigating risk is strictly voluntary, but highly recommended by SSA.

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5.7 Management Oversight and Quality Assurance

*(The Privacy Act of 1974, E-Government Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-347), and the AC – Access Control & PM – Program Management Families, NIST SP 800-53 rev. 4)*

SSA requires the EIEP to establish and/or maintain ongoing management oversight and quality assurance capabilities to ensure that only authorized users have access to SSA-provided information. This will ensure there is ongoing compliance with the terms of the EIEP’s electronic information sharing agreement with SSA and the TSSRs established for access to SSA-provided information. The entity responsible for management oversight should consist of one or more of the EIEP’s management officials whose job functions include responsibility to ensure that the EIEP only grants access to the appropriate users and position types (least privilege), which require the SSA-provided information to do their jobs (need-to-know).

SSA requires the EIEP to ensure that users granted access to SSA-provided information receive adequate training on the sensitivity of the information, associated safeguards, operating procedures, and the civil and criminal consequences or penalties for misuse or improper disclosure.

SSA requires that EIEPs establish the following job functions and require that only users whose job functions are separate from personnel who request or use SSA-provided information.

**SSA requires that EIEPs establish the following job functions separate from personnel who request or use SSA-provided information.**

a) Perform periodic self-reviews to monitor the EIEP’s ongoing usage of SSA-provided information.

b) Perform random sampling of work activity that involves SSA-provided information to determine if the access and usage comply with SSA’s requirements.

SSA requires the EIEP’s system to produce reports that allow management and/or supervisors to monitor user activity. The EIEP must have a process for distributing these monitoring and exception reports to appropriate local managers/supervisors or to local security officers. The process must ensure that only those whose responsibilities include monitoring anomalous activity of users, to include those who have exceptional system rights and privileges, use the reports.
1. User ID Exception Reports:

   This type of report captures information about users who enter incorrect user IDs when attempting to gain access to the system or to a transaction that initiates requests for information from SSA, including failed attempts to enter a password.

2. Inquiry Match Exception Reports:

   This type of report captures information about users who initiate transactions for SSNs that have no client case association within the EIEP’s system (the EIEP’s management must review 100% of these cases).

3. System Error Exception Reports:

   This type of report captures information about users who may not understand or may be violating proper procedures for access to SSA-provided information.

4. Inquiry Activity Statistical Reports:

   This type of report captures information about transaction usage patterns among authorized users and is a tool that enables the EIEP’s management to monitor typical usage patterns in contrast to extraordinary usage patterns.

The EIEP must have a process for distributing these monitoring and exception reports to appropriate local managers/supervisors or to local security officers. The process must ensure that only those whose responsibilities include monitoring anomalous activity of users, to include those who have exceptional system rights and privileges, use the reports.

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5.8 Data and Communications Security

(The Privacy Act of 1974, E-Government Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-347), and the Access Control (AC), Configuration Management (CM), Media Protection (MP), and System and Communication (SC) Families, NIST SP 800-53 rev. 4)

SSA requires EIEPs to encrypt PII and SSA-provided information when transmitting across dedicated communications circuits between its systems, intrastate communications between its local office locations, and on the EIEP’s mobile computers, devices and removable media. The EIEP’s encryption methods must align with the Guidelines established by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). SSA recommends the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) or Triple DES (Data Encryption Standard 3). **Files encrypted for external users (when using tools such as Microsoft Word encryption,) require a key length of at least nine characters.** SSA recommends that the key (also referred to as a password) contain both special characters and numbers. SSA supports the NIST Guidelines that requires the EIEP deliver the key so that it does not accompany the media. The EIEP must secure the key when not in use or unattended.

SSA discourages the use of the public Internet for transmission of SSA-provided information. If, however, the EIEP uses the public Internet or other electronic communications, such as emails and faxes to transmit SSA-provided information, they must use a secure encryption protocol such as Secure Socket Layer (SSL) or Transport Layer Security (TLS). SSA also recommends 256-bit encryption protocols or more secure methods such as Virtual Private Network technology. The EIEP should only send data to a secure address or device to which the EIEP can control and limit access to only specifically authorized individuals and/or processes. **SSA recommends that EIEPs use Media Access Control (MAC) Filtering and Firewalls to protect access points from unauthorized devices attempting to connect to the network.**

EIEPs should not retain SSA-provided information any longer than business purpose(s) dictate. The IEA with SSA stipulates a time for data retention. The EIEP should delete, purge, destroy, or return SSA-provided information when the business purpose for retention no longer exists.

The EIEP may not save or create separate files comprised solely of information provided by SSA. The EIEP may apply specific SSA-provided information to the EIEP’s matched record from a preexisting data source. Federal law prohibits duplication and redisclosure of SSA-provided information without written approval from SSA.
This prohibition applies to both internal and external sources who do not have a “need-to-know.” SSA recommends that EIEPs use either **Trusted Platform Module (TPM)** or **Hardware Security Module (HSM)** technology solutions to encrypt data at rest on hard drives and other data storage media.

SSA requires EIEPs to prevent unauthorized disclosure of SSA-provided information after they complete processing and after the EIEP no longer requires the information. The EIEP’s operational processes must ensure that no residual SSA-provided information remains on the hard drives of user’s workstations after the user exits the application(s) that use SSA-provided information. If the EIEP must send a computer, hard drive, or other computing or storage device offsite for repair, the EIEP must have a non-disclosure clause in their contract with the vendor. If the EIEP used the item in connection with a business process that involved SSA-provided information and the vendor will retrieve or may view SSA-provided information during servicing, SSA reserves the right to inspect the EIEP’s vendor contract. The EIEP must remove SSA-provided information from electronic devices before sending it to an external vendor for service. SSA expects the EIEP to render SSA-provided information unrecoverable or destroy the electronic device if they do not need to recover the information. The same applies to excessed, donated, or sold equipment placed into the custody of another organization.

To sanitize media, the EIEP should use one of the following methods:

1. **Overwriting/Clearing:**

   Overwrite utilities can only be used on working devices. Overwriting is appropriate only for devices designed for multiple reads and writes. The EIEP should overwrite disk drives, magnetic tapes, floppy disks, USB flash drives, and other rewriteable media. The overwrite utility must completely overwrite the media. SSA recommends the use of **purging** media sanitation to make the data irretrievable, protecting data against laboratory attacks or forensics. Reformatting the media does not overwrite the data.

2. **Degaussing:**

   Degaussing is a sanitization method for magnetic media (e.g., disk drives, tapes, floppy, etc.). Degaussing is not effective for purging non-magnetic media (e.g., optical discs). SSA and NIST Guidelines require EIEP to use a certified tool designed to degauss each particular type of media. NIST guidelines require certification of the tool to ensure that the magnetic flux applied to the media is strong enough to render the information irretrievable. The degaussing process must render data on the media irretrievable by a laboratory attack or laboratory forensic procedures.
3. **Physical destruction:**

NIST guidelines require physical destruction when degaussing or overwriting cannot be accomplished (for example, CDs, floppies, DVDs, damaged tapes, hard drives, damaged USB flash drives, etc.). Examples of physical destruction include shredding, pulverizing, and burning.

State agencies may retain SSA-provided information in hardcopy only if required to fulfill evidentiary requirements, provided the agencies retire such data in accordance with applicable state laws governing state agency’s retention of records. The EIEP must control print media containing SSA-provided information to restrict access to authorized employees who need such access to perform official duties. EIEPs must destroy print media containing SSA-provided information in a secure manner when no longer required for business purposes. SSA requires the EIEP to destroy paper documents that contain SSA-provided information by burning, pulping, shredding, macerating, or other similar means that ensure the information is unrecoverable.

State agencies may use any accretions, deletions, or changes to the SSA-provided information governed by the CMPPA agreement to update their master files or federally funded state-administered benefit program applicants and recipients and retain such master files in accordance with applicable state laws governing State Agencies’ retention of records.

**NOTE:** Hand tearing or lining through documents to obscure information does not meet SSA’s requirements for appropriate destruction of PII.

The EIEP must employ measures to ensure that communications and data furnished to SSA contain no viruses or other malware.

**Special Note regarding Cloud Service Providers:**

If the EIEP will store SSA-provided information through a Cloud Service Provider, please provide the name and address of the cloud provider. Describe the security responsibilities the contract requires to protect SSA-provided information. SSA will ask for detailed descriptions of the security features contractually required of the cloud provider and information regarding how they will protect SSA-provided information at rest and when in transit.

**EIEPs cannot legally process, transmit, or store SSA-provided information in a cloud environment without explicit permission from SSA’s Chief Information Officer.**

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5.9 Incident Reporting

(The Privacy Act of 1974, E-Government Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-347), and the Incident Response (IR) Family, NIST SP 800-53 rev. 4)

FISMA, NIST Guidelines, and Federal Law require the EIEP to develop and implement policies and procedures to respond to potential data breaches or PII loses. EIEPs must articulate, in writing, how the policies and procedures conform to SSA’s requirements. The procedures must include the following information:

If your agency experiences or suspects a breach or loss of PII or a security incident, which includes SSA-provided information, they must notify the State official responsible for Systems Security designated in the agreement. That State official or delegate must then notify the SSA Regional Office Contact or the SSA Systems Security Contact identified in the agreement. If, for any reason, the responsible State official or delegate is unable to notify the SSA Regional Office or the SSA Systems Security Contact within one hour, the responsible State Agency official or delegate must report the incident by contacting SSA’s National Network Service Center (NNSC) toll free at 877-697-4889 (select “Security and PII Reporting” from the options list). The EIEP will provide updates as they become available to SSA contact, as appropriate. Refer to the worksheet provided in the agreement to facilitate gathering and organizing information about an incident.

If SSA, or another Federal investigating entity (e.g. TIGTA or DOJ), determines that the risk presented by a breach or security incident requires that the state agency notify the subject individuals, the agency must agree to absorb all costs associated with notification and remedial actions connected to security breaches. SSA and NIST Guidelines encourage agencies to consider establishing incident response teams to address PII and SSA-provided information breaches.

Incident reporting policies and procedures are part of the security awareness program. Incident reporting pertains to all employees, contractors, or agents regardless as to whether they have direct responsibility for contacting SSA. The written policy and procedures document should include specific names, titles, or functions of the individuals responsible for each stage of the notification process. The document should include detailed instructions for how, and to whom each employee, contractor, or agent should report the potential breach or PII loss.

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5.10 Security Awareness Training and User Sanctions
(The Privacy Act of 1974, E-Government Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-347), and Awareness and Training (AT), Personnel Security (PS), and Program Management (PM) Families, NIST SP 800-53 rev. 4)

The EIEP must have an active and robust security awareness program and security training for all employees, contractors, and agents who access SSA-provided information. The training and awareness programs must include:

a. the sensitivity of SSA-provided information and addresses the Privacy Act and other Federal and state laws governing its use and misuse,

b. the rules of behavior concerning use and security in systems and/or applications processing SSA-provided information,

c. the restrictions on viewing and/or copying SSA-provided information,

d. the responsibilities of employees, contractors, and agents’ pertaining to the proper use and protection of SSA-provided information,

e. the proper disposal of SSA-provided information,

f. the security breach and data loss incident reporting procedures,

g. the basic understanding of procedures to protect the network from malware attacks,

h. spoofing, phishing and pharming, and network fraud prevention, and

i. the possible criminal and civil sanctions and penalties for misuse of SSA-provided information.

SSA requires the EIEP to provide security awareness training to all employees, contractors, and agents who access SSA-provided information. The training should be annual, mandatory, and certified by the personnel who receive the training. SSA also requires the EIEP to certify that each employee, contractor, and agent who views SSA-provided information certify that they understand the potential criminal, civil, and administrative sanctions or penalties for unlawful assess and/or disclosure.
SSA requires the EIEP to provide security awareness training to all employees, contractors, and agents who access SSA-provided information. The training should be annual, mandatory, and certified by the personnel who receive the training. SSA also requires the EIEP to certify that each employee, contractor, or agent who views SSA-provided information also certify that they understand the potential criminal and administrative sanctions or penalties for unlawful disclosure. SSA requires the state agency to require employees, contractors, and agents to sign a non-disclosure agreement, attest to their receipt of Security Awareness Training, and acknowledge the rules of behavior concerning proper use and security in systems that process SSA-provided information. The non-disclosure attestation must also include acknowledgement from each employee, contractor, and agent that he or she understands and accepts the potential criminal and/or civil sanctions or penalties associated with misuse or unauthorized disclosure of SSA-provided information. The state agency must retain the non-disclosure attestations for at least five (5) to seven (7) years for each individual who processes, views, or encounters SSA-provided information as part of their duties.

SSA strongly recommends the use of login banners, emails, posters, signs, memoranda, special events, and other promotional materials to encourage security awareness throughout your enterprise.

The state agency must designate a department or party to take the responsibility to provide ongoing security awareness training for all employees, contractors, and agents who access SSA-provided information. Training must include:

- The sensitivity of SSA-provided information and address the Privacy Act and other Federal and state laws governing its use and misuse
- Rules of behavior concerning use and security in systems processing SSA-provided information
- Restrictions on viewing and/or copying SSA-provided information
- The employee, contractor, and agent’s responsibility for proper use and protection of SSA-provided information
- Proper disposal of SSA-provided information
- Security incident reporting procedures
- Basic understanding of procedures to protect the network from malware attacks
- Spoofing, Phishing and Pharming scam prevention
- The possible sanctions and penalties for misuse of SSA-provided information

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5.11 Contractors of Electronic Information Exchange Partners  
and Risk Assessment (RA), System and Services Acquisition (SA),  
Awareness and Training (AT), Personnel Security (PS), and Program  
Management (PM) Families, NIST SP 800-53 rev. 4)

The state agency’s employees, contractors, and agents who access, use, or  
disclose SSA data in a manner or purpose not authorized by the Agreement  
may be subject to both civil and criminal sanctions pursuant to applicable  
Federal statutes. The state agency will provide its contractors and agents with  
copies of the Agreement, related IEAs, and all related attachments before  
initial disclosure of SSA data to such contractors and agents. Prior to signing  
the Agreement, and thereafter at SSA’s request, the state agency will obtain  
from its contractors and agents a current list of the employees of such  
contractors and agents with access to SSA data and provide such lists to SSA.

Contractors of the state agency must adhere to the same security  
requirements as employees of the state agency. The state agency is  
responsible for the oversight of its contractors and the contractor’s  
compliance with the security requirements. The state agency must enter into  
a written agreement with each of its contractors and agents who need SSA  
data to perform their official duties. Such contractors or agents agree to  
abide by all relevant Federal laws, restrictions on access, use, disclosure, and  
the security requirements contained within the state agency’s agreement with  
SSA.

The state agency must provide proof of the contractual agreement with all  
contractors and agents who encounter SSA-provided information as part of  
their duties. If the contractor processes, handles, or transmits information  
provided to the state agency by SSA or has authority to perform on the state  
agency’s behalf, the state agency should clearly state the specific roles and  
functions of the contractor within the agreement. The state agency will  
provide SSA written certification that the contractor is meeting the terms of  
the agreement, including SSA security requirements. The service level  
agreements with the contractors and agents must contain non-disclosure  
language as it pertains to SSA-provided information.

The state agency must also require that contractors and agents who will  
process, handle, or transmit information provided to the state agency by SSA to  
include language in their signed agreement that obligates the contractor to  
follow the terms of the state agency’s data exchange agreement with SSA. The  
state agency must also make certain that the contractor and agent’s employees  
receive the same security awareness training as the state agency’s employees.  
The state agency, the contractor, and the agent should maintain awareness-  
training records for their employees and require the same mandatory annual
SSA requires the state agency to subject the contractor to ongoing security compliance reviews that must meet SSA standards. The state agency will conduct compliance reviews at least triennially commencing no later than three (3) years after the approved initial security certification to SSA. The state agencies will provide SSA with documentation of their recurring compliance reviews of their contractors and agents. The state agencies will provide the documentation to SSA during their scheduled compliance and certification reviews or upon SSA’s request.

If the state agency’s contractor will be involved with the processing, handling, or transmission of information provided to the EIEP by SSA offsite from the EIEP, the EIEP must have the contractual option to perform onsite reviews of that offsite facility to ensure that the following meet SSA’s requirements:

a) safeguards for sensitive information,

b) technological safeguards on computer(s) that have access to SSA-provided information,

c) security controls and measures to prevent, detect, and resolve unauthorized access to, use of, and redisclosure of SSA-provided information, and

d) continuous monitoring of the EIEP contractors or agent’s network infrastructures and assets.

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5.12 Cloud Service Providers (CSP) for Electronic Information Exchange Partners
(NIST SP 800-144, NIST SP 800-145, NIST SP 800-146, OMB Memo M-14-03, NIST SP 137)

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication (SP) 800-145 defines Cloud Computing as “a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction. This cloud model is composed of five essential characteristics, three service models, and four deployment models.” The three service models, as defined by NIST SP 800-145 are Software as a Service (SaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS). The Deployment models are Private Cloud, Community Cloud, Public Cloud, and Hybrid Cloud. Furthermore, The Federal Risk and Authorization Program (FedRAMP) is a risk management program that provides a standardized approach for assessing and monitoring the security of cloud products and services.

SSA requires the State Agency, contractor(s), and agent(s) to exercise due diligence to avoid hindering legal actions, warrants, subpoenas, court actions, court judgments, state or Federal investigations, and SSA special inquiries for matters pertaining to SSA-provided information.

SSA requires the State Agency, contractor(s), and agent(s) to agree that any state-owned or subcontracted facility involved in the receipt, processing, storage, or disposal of SSA-provided information operate as a “de facto” extension of the State Agency and is subject to onsite inspection and review by the State Agency or SSA with prior notice.

SSA requires that the State Agency thoroughly describe all specific contractual obligations of each party to the Cloud Service Provider (CSP) agreement between the state agency and the CSP vendor(s). If the obligations, services, or conditions widely differ from agency to agency, we require separate SDP Questionnaires to address the CSP services provided to each state agency involved in the receipt, processing, storage, or disposal of SSA-provided information.

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6. Security Certification and Compliance Review Programs 
   *(NIST SP 800-18 – System Security Plans and Planning (PL) Family, NIST SP 800-53 rev. 4)*

SSA’s security certification and compliance review programs are distinct processes. The certification program is a unique episodic process when an EIEP initially requests electronic access to SSA-provided information or makes substantive changes to existing exchange protocol, delivery method, infrastructure, or platform. The certification process entails two stages (refer to 6.1 for details) intended to ensure that management, operational, and technical security measures work as designed. SSA must ensure that the EIEPs fully conform to SSA’s security requirements at the time of certification and satisfy both stages of the certification process before SSA will permit online access to its data in a production environment.

The compliance review program entails cyclical security review of the EIEP performed by, or on behalf of SSA. The purpose of the review is to assess an EIEP’s conformance to SSA’s current security requirements at the time of the review engagement. The compliance review program applies to both online and batch access to SSA-provided information. Under the compliance review program, EIEPs are subject to ongoing and periodic security reviews by SSA.

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6.1 The Security Certification Program
(NIST SP 800-18 – System Security Plans, Security Assessment and Authorization Controls (CA), and Planning (PL) Families, NIST SP 800-53 rev. 4)

The security certification process applies to EIEPs that seek online electronic access to SSA-provide information and consists of two general phases:

a) **Phase 1:** The Security Design Plan (SDP) is a formal written plan authored by the EIEP to document its management, operational, and technical security controls to safeguard SSA-provided information (refer to *Documenting Security Controls in the Security Design Plan*).

*NOTE:* SSA may have legacy EIEPs (EIEPs not certified under the current process) who have not prepared an SDP. SSA strongly recommends that these EIEPs prepare an SDP.

The EIEP’s preparation and maintenance of a current SDP will aid them in determining potential compliance issues prior to reviews, assuring continued compliance with SSA’s TSSRs, and providing for more efficient security reviews.

b) **Phase 2:** The SSA Onsite Certification is a formal security review conducted by SSA, or on its behalf, to examine the full suite of management, operational, and technical security controls implemented by the EIEP to safeguard data obtained from SSA electronically (refer to *The Certification Process*).

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6.2 Documenting Security Controls in the SDP
(NIST SP 800-18 – System Security Plans, Security Assessment and Authorization Controls (CA), and Planning (PL) Families, NIST SP 800-53 rev. 4)

6.2.1 When an SDP is required:

**EIEPs must submit an SDP when one or more of the following circumstances apply:**

a) to obtain approval for requested access to SSA-provided information for an initial agreement,

b) to obtain approval to reestablish previously terminated access to SSA-provided information,

c) to obtain approval to implement a new operating or security platform that will involve SSA-provided information,

d) to obtain approval for significant changes to the EIEP’s organizational structure, technical processes, operational environment, or security implementations planned or made since approval of their most recent SDP or of their most recent successfully completed security review,

e) to confirm compliance when one or more security breaches or incidents involving SSA-provided information occurred since approval of the EIEP’s most recent SDP or of their most recent successfully completed security review,

f) to document descriptions and explanations of measures implemented as the result of a data breach or security incident,

g) to document descriptions and explanations of measures implemented to resolve non-compliance issue(s), and

h) to obtain a new approval after SSA revoked approval of the most recent SDP

SSA may require a new SDP if changes occurred (other than those listed above) that may affect the terms of the EIEP’s data exchange agreement with SSA.
SSA will not approve the SDP or allow the initiation of transactions and/or access to SSA-provided information before the EIEP complies with the TSSRs.

NOTE: EIEPs that function only as an STC, transferring SSA-provided information to other EIEPs must, per the terms of their agreements with SSA, adhere to SSA’s TSSR and exercise their responsibilities regarding protection of SSA-provided information. (See Page 48 Definition of STC)

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6.3 The Certification Process

*(NIST SP 800-18 – System Security Plans, Security Assessment and Authorization Controls (CA), and Planning (PL) Families, NIST SP 800-53 rev. 4)*

Once the EIEP has successfully satisfied Phase 1, SSA will conduct an onsite certification review. The objective of the onsite review is to ensure the EIEP’s management, operational, and technical controls safeguarding SSA-provided information from misuse and improper disclosure and that those safeguards function and work as intended.

At its discretion, SSA may request the EIEP to participate in an onsite review and compliance certification of their security infrastructure.

The onsite review may address any or all of SSA’s security requirements and include, when appropriate:

1) a demonstration of the EIEP’s implementation of each security requirement,

2) a physical review of pertinent supporting documentation to verify the accuracy of responses in the SDP,

3) a demonstration of the functionality of the software interface for the system that will receive, process, and store SSA-provided information,

4) a demonstration of the Automated Audit Trail System (ATS),

5) a walkthrough of the EIEP’s data center to observe and document physical security safeguards,

6) a demonstration of the EIEP’s implementation of electronic exchange of data with SSA,

7) a discussions with managers, supervisors, information security officers, system administrators, or other state stakeholders,

8) an examination of management control procedures and reports pertaining to anomaly detection or anomaly prevention,

9) a demonstration of technical tools pertaining to user access control and, if appropriate, browsing prevention,
10) a demonstration of the permission module or similar design, to show how the system triggers requests for information from SSA.

11) a demonstration of how the process for requests for SSA-provided information prevents SSNs not present in the EIEP’s system from sending requests to SSA.

**We may attempt to obtain information from SSA using at least one, randomly created, fictitious number not known to the EIEPs system.**

During a certification or compliance review, SSA or a certifier acting on its behalf, may request a demonstration of the EIEP’s ATS and its record retrieval capability. SSA or a certifier may request a demonstration of the ATS’ capability to track the activity of employees who have the potential to access SSA-provided information within the EIEP’s system. The certifier may request more information from those EIEPs who use an STC to handle and audit transactions. SSA or a certifier may conduct a demonstration to see how the EIEP obtains audit information from the STC regarding the EIEP’s SSA transactions.

If an STC handles and audits an EIEP’s transactions, SSA requires the EIEP to demonstrate both their in-house audit capabilities and the process used to obtain audit information from the STC.

If the EIEP employs a contractor or agent who processes, handles, or transmits the EIEP’s SSA-provided information offsite, SSA, at its discretion, may request to include the contractor’s facility in the onsite certification review. The inspection may occur with or without a representative of the EIEP.

Upon successful completion of the onsite certification review, SSA will authorize electronic access to production data by the EIEP. SSA will provide written notification of its certification to the EIEP and all appropriate internal SSA components.

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6.5 The Compliance Review Program and Process

(NIST SP 800-18 – System Security Plans, Configuration Management (CM), Security Assessment and Authorization Controls (CA), and Planning (PL) Families, NIST SP 800-53 rev. 4)

Similar to the certification process, the compliance review program entails a process intended to ensure that EIEPs that receive electronic information from SSA are in full compliance with the SSA’s TSSRs. SSA requires EIEPs to complete and submit (based on a timeline agreed upon by SSA and EIEP’s stakeholders) a Compliance Review Questionnaire (CRQ). The CRQ (similar to the SDP), describes the EIEP’s management, operational, and technical controls used to protect SSA-provided information from misuse and improper disclosure. We also want to verify that those safeguards function and work as intended.

As a practice, SSA attempts to conduct compliance reviews following a 3-5 year periodic review schedule. However, as circumstances warrant, a review may take place at any time. Three prominent examples that would trigger an ad hoc review are:

A. a significant change in the outside EIEP’s computing platform,

B. a violation of any of SSA’s TSSRs, or

C. an unauthorized disclosure of SSA-provided information by the EIEP.

SSA may conduct onsite compliance reviews and include both the EIEP’s main facility and a field office.

SSA may, at its discretion, request that the EIEP participate in an onsite compliance review of their security infrastructure to confirm the implementation of SSA’s security requirements.

The onsite review may address any or all of SSA’s security requirements and include, where appropriate:

D. a demonstration of the EIEP’s implementation of each requirement

E. a random sampling of audit records and transactions submitted to SSA

F. a walkthrough of the EIEP’s data center to observe and document physical security safeguards

G. a demonstration of the EIEP’s implementation of online exchange of data with SSA,
H. a discussion with managers, supervisors, information security officers, system administrators, or other state stakeholders,

I. an examination of management control procedures and reports pertaining to anomaly detection and prevention reports,

J. a demonstration of technical tools pertaining to user access control and, if appropriate, browsing prevention,

K. a demonstration of how a permission module or similar design triggers requests for information from SSA, and

L. a demonstration of how a permission module prevents the EIEP’s system from processing SSNs not present in the EIEP’s system.

1) We can accomplish this by attempting to obtain information from SSA using at least one, randomly created, fictitious number not known to the EIEP’s system.

SSA may perform an onsite or remote review for reasons including, but not limited, to the following:

a) the EIEP has experienced a security breach or incident involving SSA-provided information

b) the EIEP has unresolved non-compliancy issue(s)

c) to review an offsite contractor's facility that processes SSA-provided information

d) the EIEP is a legacy organization that has not yet been through SSAs security certification and compliance review programs

e) the EIEP requested that SSA perform an IV & V (Independent Verification and Validation review)

During the compliance review, SSA, or a certifier acting on its behalf, may request a demonstration of the system’s audit trail and retrieval capability. The certifier may request a demonstration of the system’s capability for tracking the activity of employees who view SSA-provided information within the EIEP’s system. The certifier may request EIEPs that have STCs that handle and audit transactions with SSA to demonstrate the process used to obtain audit information from the STC.

If an STC handles and audits the EIEP’s transactions with SSA, we may require the EIEP to demonstrate both their in-house audit capabilities and the processes used to
obtain audit information from the STC regarding the EIEP’s transactions with SSA.

If the EIEP employs a contractor who will process, handle, or transmit the EIEP’s SSA-provided information offsite, SSA, at its discretion, may request to include in the onsite compliance review an onsite inspection of the contractor’s facility. The inspection may occur with or without a representative of the EIEP. The format of the review in routine circumstances (e.g., the compliance review is not being conducted to address a special circumstance, such as a disclosure violation, etc.) will generally consist of reviewing and updating the EIEP’s compliance with the systems security requirements described above in this document. At the conclusion of the review, SSA will issue a formal report to appropriate EIEP personnel. The Compliance Report will address findings and recommendations from SSA’s compliance review, which includes a plan for monitoring each issue until closure.

**NOTE:** SSA will never request documentation for compliance reviews unless necessary to assess the EIEP’s security posture. The information is only accessible to authorized individuals who have a need for the information as it relates to the EIEP’s compliance with its electronic data exchange agreement with SSA and the associated system security requirements and procedures. SSA will not retain the EIEP’s documentation any longer than required. SSA will delete, purge, or destroy the documentation when the retention requirement expires.

Compliance Reviews are either on-site or remote reviews. High-risk reviews must be onsite reviews, medium risk reviews are usually onsite, and low risk reviews may qualify for a remote review via telephone. The past performance of the entire state determines whether a review is onsite or remote. SSA determines a state’s risk level based on the “high water mark principle.” If one agency is high risk, the entire state is high risk. The following is a high-level example of the analysis that aids SSA in making a preliminary determination as to which review format is appropriate. SSA may also use additional factors to determine whether SSA will perform an onsite or remote compliance review.

### A. High/Medium Risk Criteria

1) undocumented closing of prior review finding(s),

2) implementation of management, operational or technical controls that affect security of SSA-provided information (e.g. implementation of new data access method), or

3) a reported PII breach within the state.
B. Low Risk Criteria

1) no prior review finding(s) or prior finding(s) documented as closed

2) no implementation of technical/operational controls that impact security of SSA provided

3) information (e.g. implementation of new data access method) no reported PII breach

6.5.1 EIEP Compliance Review Participation

SSA may request to meet with the following stakeholders during the compliance review:

a) a sample of managers, supervisors, information security officers, system administrators, etc. responsible for enforcing and monitoring ongoing compliance to security requirements and procedures to assess their level of training to monitor their employee’s use of SSA-provided information, and for reviewing reports and taking necessary action

b) the individuals responsible for performing security awareness and employee sanction functions to learn how EIEPs fulfill this requirement

c) a sample of the EIEP’s employees to assess their level of training and understanding of the requirements and potential sanctions applicable to the use and misuse of SSA-provided information

d) the individual(s) responsible for management oversight and quality assurance functions to confirm how the EIEP accomplishes this requirement

e) any additional individuals as deemed appropriate by SSA (i.e. analysts, Project/Program Manager, claims reps, etc.)

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6.6 Scheduling the Onsite Review

SSA will not schedule the onsite review until SSA approves the EIEP’s SDP or the EIEPs stakeholders participating in the compliance review have agreed upon a schedule. There is no prescribed period for arranging the subsequent onsite review (certification review for an EIEP requesting initial access to SSA-provided information for an initial agreement or compliance review for other EIEPs). Unless there are compelling circumstances precluding it; the onsite review will occur as soon as reasonably possible.

The scheduling of the onsite review may depend on additional factors including:

a) the reason for submission of an SDP or CRQ,

b) the severity of security issues, if any,

c) circumstances of the previous review, if any, and

d) SSA’s workload and resource considerations.

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7. Additional Definitions

Back Button:

Refers to a button on a web browser’s toolbar, the backspace button on a computer keyboard, a programmed keyboard button or mouse button, etc., that returns a user to a previously visited web page or application screen.

Breach:

Refers to actual loss, loss of control, compromise, unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized acquisition, unauthorized access, or any similar term referring to situations where unauthorized persons have access or potential access to PII or Covered Information, whether physical, electronic, or in spoken word or recording

Browsing:

Requests for or queries of SSA-provided information for purposes not related to the performance of official job duties

Choke Point:

The firewall between a local network and the Internet is a choke point in network security, because any attacker would have to come through that channel, which is typically protected and monitored.

Cloud Computing:

The term refers to Internet-based computing derived from the cloud drawing representing the Internet in computer network diagrams. Cloud computing providers deliver on-line and on-demand Internet services. Cloud Services normally use a browser or Web Server to deliver and store information.

### Cloud Computing (NIST SP 800-145 Excerpt):

Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction. This cloud model is composed of five essential characteristics, three service models, and four deployment models.

#### Essential Characteristics:

**On-demand self-service** - A consumer can unilaterally provision computing capabilities, such as server time and network storage, as needed automatically without requiring human interaction with each service provider.

**Broad network access** - Capabilities are available over the network and accessed through standard mechanisms that promote use by heterogeneous thin or thick client platforms (e.g., mobile phones, tablets, laptops, and workstations).
Resource pooling - The provider’s computing resources are pooled to serve multiple consumers using a multi-tenant model, with different physical and virtual resources dynamically assigned and reassigned according to consumer demand. There is a sense of location independence in that the customer generally has no control or knowledge over the exact location of the provided resources but may be able to specify location at a higher level of abstraction (e.g., country, state, or datacenter). Examples of resources include storage, processing, memory, and network bandwidth.

Rapid elasticity - Capabilities can be elastically provisioned and released, in some cases automatically, to scale rapidly outward and inward commensurate with demand. To the consumer, the capabilities available for provisioning often appear to be unlimited and can be appropriated in any quantity at any time.

Measured service - Cloud systems automatically control and optimize resource use by leveraging a metering capability1 at some level of abstraction appropriate to the type of service (e.g., storage, processing, bandwidth, and active user accounts). Resource usage can be monitored, controlled, and reported, providing transparency for both the provider and consumer of the utilized service.

Service Models:

Software as a Service (SaaS) - The capability provided to the consumer is to use the provider’s applications running on a cloud infrastructure2. The applications are accessible from various client devices through either a thin client interface, such as a web browser (e.g., web-based email), or a program interface. The consumer does not manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure including network, servers, operating systems, storage, or even individual application capabilities, with the possible exception of limited user-specific application configuration settings.

Platform as a Service (PaaS) - The capability provided to the consumer is to deploy onto the cloud infrastructure consumer-created or acquired applications created using programming languages, libraries, services, and tools supported by the provider.3 The consumer does not manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure including network, servers, operating systems, or storage, but has control over the deployed applications and possibly configuration settings for the application-hosting environment.

Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) - The capability provided to the consumer is to provision processing, storage, networks, and other fundamental computing resources where the consumer is able to deploy and run arbitrary software, which can include operating systems and applications. The consumer does not manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure but has control over operating systems, storage, and deployed applications; and possibly limited control of select networking components (e.g., host firewalls).

Deployment Models:

Private cloud - The cloud infrastructure is provisioned for exclusive use by a single organization comprising multiple consumers (e.g., business units). It may be owned, managed, and operated by the organization, a third party, or some combination of them, and it may exist on or off premises.

Community cloud - The cloud infrastructure is provisioned for exclusive use by a specific
community of consumers from organizations that have shared concerns (e.g., mission, security
requirements, policy, and compliance considerations). It may be owned, managed, and operated by
one or more of the organizations in the community, a third party, or some combination of them, and
it may exist on or off premises.

**Public cloud** - The cloud infrastructure is provisioned for open use by the general public. It may be
owned, managed, and operated by a business, academic, or government organization, or some
combination of them. It exists on the premises of the cloud provider.

**Hybrid cloud** - The cloud infrastructure is a composition of two or more distinct cloud
infrastructures (private, community, or public) that remain unique entities, but are bound together
by standardized or proprietary technology that enables data and application portability (e.g., cloud
bursting for load balancing between clouds).

1 Typically this is done on a pay-per-use or charge-per-use basis.

2 A cloud infrastructure is the collection of hardware and software that enables the five essential
characteristics of cloud computing. The cloud infrastructure can be viewed as containing both a physical
layer and an abstraction layer. The physical layer consists of the hardware resources that are necessary to
support the cloud services being provided, and typically includes server, storage and network components.
The abstraction layer consists of the software deployed across the physical layer, which manifests the
essential cloud characteristics. Conceptually the abstraction layer sits above the physical layer.

3 This capability does not necessarily preclude the use of compatible programming languages, libraries,
services, and tools from other sources.

Cloud Drive:

A cloud drive is a Web-based service that provides storage space on a remote server.

Cloud Audit:

Cloud Audit is a specification developed at Cisco Systems, Inc. that provides cloud
computing service providers a standard way to present and share detailed,
automated statistics about performance and security.

The Federal Risk and Authorization Program (FedRAMP):
FedRAMP is a risk management program that provides a standardized approach
for assessing and monitoring the security of cloud products and services.

Commingling:

Commingling is the creation of a common database or repository that stores and
maintains both SSA-provided information and preexisting EIEP PII.
Data Exchange:
Data Exchange is a logical transfer of information from one government entity’s systems of records (SOR) to another agency’s application or mainframe through a secure and exclusive connection.

Degaussing:
Degaussing is the method of using a “special device” (i.e., a device that generates a magnetic field) in order to disrupt magnetically recorded information. Degaussing can be effective for purging damaged media and media with exceptionally large storage capacities. Degaussing is not effective for purging non-magnetic media (e.g., optical discs).

Function:
One or more persons or organizational components assigned to serve a particular purpose, or perform a particular role. The purpose, activity, or role assigned to one or more persons or organizational components.

Hub:
As it relates to electronic data exchange with SSA, a hub is an organization, which serves as an electronic information conduit or distribution collection point. The term Hub is interchangeable with the terms “StateTransmission Component,” “State Transfer Component,” or “STC.”

ICON:
Interstate Connection Network (various entities use 'Connectivity' rather than 'Connection')

IV & V:
Independent Verification and Validation

Legacy System:
A term usually referring to a corporate or organizational computer system or network that utilizes outmoded programming languages, software, and/or hardware that typically no longer receives support from the original vendors or developers.

Manual Transaction:
A user-initiated operation (also referred to as a “user-initiated transaction”). This is the opposite of a system-generated automated process.

Example: A user enters a client’s information including the client’s SSN and presses the “ENTER” key to acknowledge that input of data is complete. A new screen appears with multiple options, which include “VERIFY SSN” and “CONTINUE”. The user has the option to verify the client’s SSN or perform alternative actions.
Media Sanitization:

f) **Disposal:** Refers to the discarding (e.g., recycling) media that contains no sensitive or confidential data.

g) **Overwriting/Clearing:** This type of media sanitization is adequate for protecting information from a robust keyboard attack. Clearing must prevent retrieval of information by data, disk, or file recovery utilities. Clearing must be resistant to keystroke recovery attempts executed from standard input devices and from data scavenging tools. For example, overwriting is an acceptable method for clearing media. Deleting items, however, is not sufficient for clearing.

This process may include overwriting all addressable locations of the data, as well as its logical storage location (e.g., its file allocation table). The aim of the overwriting process is to replace or obfuscate existing information with random data. Most rewriteable media may be cleared by a single overwrite. This method of sanitization is not possible on un-writeable or damaged media.

h) **Purging:** This type of media sanitization is a process that protects information from a laboratory attack. The terms *clearing* and *purging* are sometimes synonymous. However, for some media, clearing is not sufficient for purging (i.e., protecting data from a laboratory attack). Although most re-writeable media requires a single overwrite, purging may require multiple rewrites using different characters for each write cycle.

This is because a laboratory attack involves threats with the capability to employ non-standard assets (e.g., specialized hardware) to attempt data recovery on media outside of that media’s normal operating environment.

i) Degaussing is also an example of an acceptable method for purging magnetic media. The EIEP should destroy media if purging is not a viable method for sanitization.

- **Destruction:** Physical destruction of media is the most effective form of sanitization. Methods of destruction include burning, pulverizing, and shredding. Any residual medium should be able to withstand a laboratory attack.
Permission module:
A utility or subprogram within an application, which automatically enforces the relationship of a request for or query of SSA-provided information to an authorized process or transaction before initiating a transaction. The System will not allow a user to request information from SSA unless the EIEP’s client system contains a record of the subject individual’s SSN. A properly configured Permission Module also enforces referential integrity and prevents unauthorized random browsing of PII.

Screen Scraping:
Screen scraping is normally associated with the programmatic collection of visual data from a source. Originally, screen scraping referred to the practice of reading text data from a computer display terminal’s screen. This involves reading the terminal’s memory through its auxiliary port, or by connecting the terminal output port of one computer system to an input port on another. The term screen scraping is synonymous with the term bidirectional exchange of data.

A screen scraper might connect to a legacy system via Telnet, emulate the keystrokes needed to navigate the legacy user interface, process the resulting display output, extract the desired data, and pass it on to a modern system.

More modern screen scraping techniques include capturing the bitmap data from a screen and running it through an optical character reader engine, or in the case of graphical user interface applications, querying the graphical controls by programatically obtaining references to their underlying programming objects.

Security Breach:
An act from outside an organization that bypasses or violates security policies, practices, or procedures.

Security Incident:
A security incident happens when a fact or event signifies the possibility that a breach of security may be taking place, or may have taken place. All threats are security incidents, but not all security incidents are threats.

Security Violation:
An act from within an organization that bypasses or disobeys security policies, practices, or procedures.
Sensitive data:

Sensitive data is a special category of personally identifiable information (PII) that has the potential to cause great harm to an individual, government agency, or program if abused, misused, or breached. It is sensitive information protected against unwarranted disclosure and carries specific criminal and civil penalties for an individual convicted of unauthorized access, disclosure, or misuse. Protection of sensitive information usually involves specific classification or legal precedents that provide special protection for legal and ethical reasons.

Security Information Management (SIM):

SIM is software that automates the collection of event log data from security devices such as firewalls, proxy servers, intrusion detection systems and anti-virus software. The SIM translates the data into correlated and simplified formats.

SMDS (Switched Multimegabit Data Service (SMDS):

SMDS is a telecommunications service that provides connectionless, high-performance, packet-switched data transport. Although not a protocol, it supports standard protocols and communications interfaces using current technology.

SSA-provided data/information:

Synonymous with “SSA-supplied data/information”, defines information under the control of SSA provided to an external entity under the terms of an information exchange agreement with SSA. The following are examples of SSA-provided data/information:

- SSA’s response to a request from an EIEP for information from SSA (e.g., date of death)
- SSA’s response to a query from an EIEP for verification of an SSN

SSA data/information:

This term, sometimes used interchangeably with “SSA-provided data/information,” denotes information under the control of SSA provided to an external entity under the terms of an information exchange agreement with SSA. However, “SSA data/information” also includes information provided to the EIEP by a source other than SSA, but which the EIEP attests to that SSA verified it, or the EIEP couples the information with data from SSA as to to certify the accuracy of the information. The following are examples of SSA information:

- SSA’s response to a request from an EIEP for information from SSA (e.g., date of death)
- SSA’s response to a query from an EIEP for verification of an SSN
• Display by the EIEP of SSA’s response to a query for verification of an SSN and the associated SSN provided by SSA

• Display by the EIEP of SSA’s response to a query for verification of an SSN and the associated SSN provided to the EIEP by a source other than SSA

• Electronic records that contain only SSA’s response to a query for verification of an SSN and the associated SSN whether provided to the EIEP by SSA or a source other than SSA

SSN:
Social Security Number

STC:
A State Transmission/Transfer Component is an organization, which performs as an electronic information conduit or collection point for one or more other entities (also referred to as a hub).

System-generated transaction:
A transaction automatically triggered by an automated system process.

Example: A user enters a client’s information including the client’s SSN on an input screen and presses the “ENTER” key to acknowledge that input of data is complete. An automated process then matches the SSN against the organization’s database and when the systems finds no match, automatically sends an electronic request for verification of the SSN to SSA.

Systems process:
Systems Process refers to a software program module that runs in the background within an automated batch, online, or other process.

Third Party:
Third Party pertains to an entity (person or organization) provided access to SSA-provided information by an EIEP or other SSA business partner for which one or more of the following apply:

• is not stipulated access to SSA-provided information by an information-sharing agreement between an EIEP and SSA
• has no data exchange agreement with SSA
• SSA does not directly authorize access to SSA-provided information

Transaction-driven:
This term pertains to an automatically initiated online query of or request for SSA information by an automated transaction process (e.g., driver license issuance, etc.). The query or request will only occur the automated process meets prescribed conditions.
Uncontrolled transaction:
This term pertains to a transaction that falls outside a permission module. An uncontrolled transaction is not subject to a systematically enforced relationship between an authorized process or application and an existing client record.

8. Regulatory References

- Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publications
- Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA)
- Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD-12)
- National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publications
- Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-123, Management’s Responsibility for Internal Control
- Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-130, Appendix III, Management of Federal Information Resources
- Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Memo M-06-16, Protection of Sensitive Agency Information, June 23, 2006
- Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Memo M-07-17, Safeguarding Against and Responding to the Breach of Personally Identifiable Information, May 22, 2007
- Privacy Act of 1974, as amended

9. Frequently Asked Questions
(Click links for answers or additional information)

1. Q: What is a breach of data?

2. Q: What is employee browsing?
   A: Requests for or queries of SSA-provided information for purposes not related to the performance of official job duties

3. Q: Okay, so the EIEP submitted the SDP. Can SSA schedule the Onsite
Review?
A: Refer to Scheduling the Onsite Review.

4. Q: What is a “Permission Module?”
A: A utility or subprogram within an application, which automatically enforces the relationship of a request for or query of SSA-provided information to an authorized process or transaction before initiating a transaction. For example, if requests for verification of an SSN for issuance of a driver’s license happens automatically from within a state driver’s license application. The System will not allow a user to request information from SSA unless the EIEP’s client system contains a record of the subject individual’s SSN.

5. Q: What “Screen Scraping?”
A: Screen scraping is normally associated with the programmatic collection of visual data from a source. Originally, screen scraping referred to the practice of reading text data from a computer display terminal’s screen. This involves reading the terminal’s memory through its auxiliary port, or by connecting the terminal output port of one computer system to an input port on another. The term screen scraping is synonymous with the term bidirectional exchange of data.

A screen scraper might connect to a legacy system via Telnet, emulate the keystrokes needed to navigate the legacy user interface, process the resulting display output, extract the desired data, and pass it on to a modern system.

More modern screen scraping techniques include capturing the bitmap data from a screen and running it through an optical character reader engine, or in the case of graphical user interface applications, querying the graphical controls by programmatically obtaining references to their underlying programming objects.

6. Q: When does an EIEP have to submit an SDP?
A: Refer to When the SDP is Required.

7. Q: Does an EIEP have to submit an SDP when the agreement is renewed?
A: The EIEP does not have to submit an SDP because the agreement between the EIEP and SSA was renewed. There are, however, circumstances that require an EIEP to submit an SDP. Refer to When the SDP is Required.

8. Q: Is it acceptable to save SSA-provided information with a verified indicator on a (EIEP) workstation if the EIEP uses an encrypted hard drive? If not, what options does the agency have?
A: There is no problem with an EIEP saving SSA-provided information on the encrypted hard drives of computers used to process SSA-provided information if the EIEP retains the information only as provided for in
the EIEP’s data-sharing agreement with SSA. Refer to Data and Communications Security.

9. Q: Does SSA allow EIEPs to use caching of SSA-provided information on the EIEP’s workstations?
   A: Caching during processing is not a problem. However, SSA-provided information must clear from the cache when the user exits the application. Refer to Data and Communications Security.

10. Q: What does the term “interconnections to other systems” mean?
    A: As used in SSA’s system security requirements document, the term “interconnections” is the same as the term “connections.”

11. Q: Is it acceptable to submit the SDP as a .PDF file?
    A: No, it is not. The document must remain editable.

12. Q: Should the EIEP write the SDP from the standpoint of the EIEP SVES (or applicable data element) access itself, or from the standpoint of access to all data provided to the EIEP by SSA?
    A: The SDP is to encompass the EIEP’s entire electronic access to SSA-provided information as per the electronic data exchange agreement between the EIEP and SSA. Refer to Developing the SDP.

13. Q: If the EIEP has a “transaction-driven” system, does the EIEP still need a permission module? If employees cannot initiate a query to SSA, why would the EIEP need the permission module?
    A: “Transaction driven” means that queries submit requests automatically (and it might depend on the transaction). Depending on the system’s design, queries might not be automatic or it may still permit manual transactions. A system may require manual transactions to correct an error. SSA does not prohibit manual transactions if an ATS properly tracks such transactions. If a “transaction-driven” system permits any type of alternate access, it still requires a permission module, even if it restricts users from performing manual transactions. If the system does not require the user to be in a particular application and/or the query to be for an existing record in the EIEP’s system before the system will allow a query to go through to SSA, it would still need a permission module.

14. Q: What is an Onsite Compliance Review?
    A: The Onsite Compliance Review is SSA’s periodic site visits to its Electronic Information Exchange Partners (EIEP) to certify whether the EIEP’s management, operational, and technical security measures for protecting data obtained electronically from SSA continue to conform to the terms of the EIEP’s data sharing agreements with SSA and SSA’s associated system security requirements and procedures. Refer to the Compliance Review Program and Process.
15. Q: What are the criteria for performing an Onsite Compliance Review?  
A: The following are criteria for performing the Onsite Compliance Review:

- EIEP initiating new access or new access method for obtaining information from SSA
- EIEP’s cyclical review (previous review was performed remotely)
- EIEP has made significant change(s) in its operating or security platform involving SSA-provided information
- EIEP experienced a breach of SSA-provided personally identifying information (PII)
- EIEP has been determined to be high-risk

16. Q: What is a Remote Compliance Review?  
A: The Remote Compliance Review is when SSA conducts the meetings remotely (e.g., via conference calls). SSA schedules conference calls with its EIEPs to determine whether the EIEPs technical, managerial, and operational security measures for protecting data obtained electronically from SSA continue to conform to the terms of the EIEP’s data sharing agreements with SSA and SSA’s associated system security requirements and procedures. Refer to the Compliance Review Program and Process.

17. Q: What are the criteria for performing a Remote Compliance Review?  
A: The EIEP must satisfy the following criteria to qualify for a Remote Compliance Review:

- EIEP’s cyclical review (SSA’s previous review yielded no findings or the EIEP satisfactorily resolved cited findings)
- EIEP has made no significant change(s) in its operating or security platform involving SSA-provided information
- EIEP has not experienced a breach of SSA-provided personally identifying information (PII) since its previous compliance review.
- SSA rates the EIEP as a low-risk agency or state
ATTACHMENT 5

WORKSHEET FOR REPORTING LOSS OR POTENTIAL LOSS OF PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION
ATTACHMENT 5

Worksheet for Reporting Loss or Potential Loss of Personally Identifiable Information

1. **Information about the individual making the report to the NCSC:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name:</th>
<th>Position:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Commissioner Level Organization:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phone Numbers:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work:</td>
<td>Cell:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-mail Address:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Check one of the following:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management Official</td>
<td>Security Officer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. **Information about the data that was lost/stolen:**
Describe what was lost or stolen (e.g., case file, MBR data):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Which element(s) of PII did the data contain?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date of Birth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place of Birth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Address</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimated volume of records involved:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

3. **How was the data physically stored, packaged and/or contained?**
Paper  or  Electronic? (circle one):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>If Electronic, what type of device?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Laptop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workstation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard Drive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other (describe):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
Additional Questions if Electronic:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Not Sure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Was the device encrypted?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Was the device password protected?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. If a laptop or tablet, was a VPN SmartCard lost?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cardholder’s Name:

Cardholder’s SSA logon PIN:

Hardware Make/Model:

Hardware Serial Number:

Additional Questions if Paper:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Not Sure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Was the information in a locked briefcase?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Was the information in a locked cabinet or drawer?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Was the information in a locked vehicle trunk?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Was the information redacted?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Other circumstances:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. If the employee/contractor who was in possession of the data or to whom the data was assigned is not the person making the report to the NCSC (as listed in #1), information about this employee/contractor:

Name:

Position:

Deputy Commissioner Level Organization:

Phone Numbers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Work</th>
<th>Cell</th>
<th>Home/Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

E-mail Address:

5. Circumstances of the loss:

a. When was it lost/stolen?

b. Brief description of how the loss/theft occurred:

c. When was it reported to SSA management official (date and time)?

6. Have any other SSA components been contacted? If so, who? (Include deputy commissioner level, agency level, regional/associate level component names)
7. Which reports have been filed? (include FPS, local police, and SSA reports)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Report Filed</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Report Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federal Protective Service</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Police</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SSA-3114 (Incident Alert)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSA-342 (Report of Survey)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (describe)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. Other pertinent information (include actions under way, as well as any contacts with other agencies, law enforcement or the press):